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The Difference in Criminal Defense and the 
Difference It Makes 
Abbe Smith* 
In 1894 I opened an office and went into private practice. . . . 
When I began, it was with the intention of trying only civil 
cases. . . . I had never had anything to do with criminal cases, 
and, like most other lawyers, did not want to take them. . . . 
—Clarence Darrow1 
Strange as it may seem I grew to like to defend men and 
women charged with crime. It soon came to be something 
more than winning or losing a case. . . . [It] meant more than 
the quibbling with lawyers and juries, to get or keep money for 
a client so that I could take part of what I won or saved for 
him: I was dealing with life, with its hopes and fears, its 
aspirations and despairs. 
—Clarence Darrow2 
I. INTRODUCTION: REPRESENTING MANNY 
Last year, I undertook the representation of a young man I will 
call Manny.3 He called the clinic4 after he shot a man in the chest in 
 
 * Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Criminal Justice Clinic and E. Barrett 
Prettyman Fellowship Program, Georgetown University Law Center. I thank Vanessa Merton, 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ilene Seidman, and Michael Seidman for helpful conversations, and 
Allison Sgroi for excellent research assistance. I also thank the Fordham University School of 
Law for inviting me to present an earlier version of this piece at a faculty works-in-progress 
workshop.  
 1. CLARENCE DARROW, THE STORY OF MY LIFE 74 (1934). 
 2. Id. at 75-76. 
 3. The names and some of the details of the case have been altered to protect my client’s 
privacy. He has given me permission to write about his case. 
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the course of an argument. Manny said he hadn’t meant to shoot, but 
when he saw the man reaching for what he thought was a gun, he 
shot out of fear. He was scared still—he knew he was in serious 
trouble—and he wanted to turn himself in. Unfortunately, things 
looked bad: Manny was unlawfully carrying a gun; the man he shot 
turned out to be unarmed;5 and, although Manny fired only once, the 
other man nearly died.6  
To make matters worse, it turned out that the other man was in the 
military and had no prior criminal record. Furthermore, Manny was 
on probation for a prior drug dealing conviction.7 Although this was 
his only conviction, the conviction alone would make it difficult for 
Manny to testify. Moreover, the gun charge in itself qualified as a 
probation violation. 
When Manny came to the clinic, he immediately acknowledged 
his guilt and inquired about cooperating with the government. 
Although he had sworn off his former lifestyle, he had been a part of 
the urban drug scene long enough to have some information that 
might be of use to the authorities. Manny understood that sharing this 
information could be dangerous, but he was ready to abandon that 
life. He was twenty-eight years old. A family man, Manny took his 
responsibilities as a husband, father, and son seriously. He was 
married to his childhood sweetheart and had three young kids. He 
also looked after his ailing mother. The main reason he stayed in the 
old neighborhood, which had become increasingly rough, was his 
mother’s refusal to move. He had never shot anyone before, and was 
having trouble accepting what had happened. Manny was carrying a 
gun on the day of the incident only because someone had threatened 
 
 4. I represented this client with a post-graduate fellow in Georgetown’s E. Barrett 
Prettyman Fellowship Program.  
 5. In a peculiar variation on the Amadou Diallo case, in which a New York police officer 
shot an unarmed West African immigrant who was reaching for his wallet, see Jane Fristch & 
Amy Waldman, Diallo Jurors Begin Deliberating in Murder Trial of Four Officers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at 1; see also, Editorial, The Diallo Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, 
at A14. The complainant’s version of the events at sentencing was that he reached for a wallet 
in the waistband of his sweat pants to hand to a bystander because he believed there would be a 
fistfight.  
 6. Manny shot the complainant in the chest, causing him to lose part of his lung. 
 
 7. Aside from this incident, Manny had done well on probation. He reported regularly to 
his probation officer, had refrained from drug use, and was holding a steady job with a carpet 
cleaning service. 
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him. 
Manny turned himself in and accepted a plea agreement that 
included cooperation. Over the next twelve months he was repeatedly 
questioned by police and prosecutors, underwent lie detector tests, 
and testified before grand juries and trial juries.  
Finally, it was time for Manny’s sentencing. I was feeling 
cautiously optimistic, and shared this with Manny. A number of 
things had fallen into place. We had managed to get Manny’s 
probation terminated without further incarceration. We had also 
arranged for his acceptance into a rigorous five-year residential 
program that specialized in working with drug offenders. The pre-
sentence report recommended the same program, and noted Manny’s 
genuine remorse and strong prospects for rehabilitation. The 
courtroom was filled with neighbors and friends who had written 
letters of support attesting to Manny’s good character.  
I told Manny that under all the facts and circumstances, including 
his surrender and guilty plea, the mitigating circumstances of the 
offense, the breadth of his cooperation, and especially, because 
Manny had now been incarcerated for more than a year, we had a 
chance of getting the sentence we were urging: time served and 
probation, conditioned on his completion of the five-year residential 
program. I told him that the worst he would get was five to fifteen 
years.8 
The judge sentenced Manny to twelve to thirty-six years. Under 
current law and practices he could easily serve thirty.  
In the aftermath of the sentencing, I had a hard time coping. I had 
completely failed my client. I had completely miscalculated the 
judge’s reaction. I felt incompetent, ineffective, and inept. I lost faith 
in my judgment. 
My friend, a civil poverty lawyer, offered comfort. Then she 
 
 8. This meant that Manny would be eligible for parole after five years, with a maximum 
possible sentence of fifteen years. I told Manny that even if the judge sentenced him to five to 
fifteen, it was likely that the judge would suspend all but five years. In this way, the judge 
would ensure that Manny served no more than five years. If the judge did not suspend part of 
the sentence, Manny’s release would be up to the discretion of the United States Parole 
Commission, and would in all likelihood be considerably more than five years. D.C. Code. 
§ 24-403.1-1 (1998) (revised sentencing law for felonies committed on or after August 5, 2000 
as a result of the “Truth in Sentencing Amendment Act of 1998”). 
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chided me: Are you so narcissistic that you never make mistakes? 
Good point, I said. Yes, I do make mistakes—but not of this 
magnitude. I reminded her that my client is looking at thirty years. 
Come on, she said. The best any of us can do is the best we can do. I 
know, I know, I said. But, I have to be able to rely on my judgment, 
and my judgment is what failed me. My client is looking at thirty 
years. Look, she persisted, I once had a case like this, a case in which 
I made a serious miscalculation, and I had a hard time getting over it. 
Then, she thought for a minute. Thank God it was just money. 
My friend, who is every bit as strong an advocate for her clients as 
I am for mine, acknowledged that criminal defense is different. No 
matter how weighty the civil case, it is different from a criminal case. 
This essay examines this difference between civil and criminal cases, 
and the difference it makes in legal ethics.  
II. A BRIEF INTERLUDE TO ACKNOWLEDGE MONROE FREEDMAN  
The preface to Monroe Freedman’s 1990 treatise, Understanding 
Lawyers’ Ethics,9 is characteristically to the point. Acknowledging 
that some of his views are controversial, he begins by issuing a 
“Caution and a Challenge” to his readers.10 He then states simply: 
“This book presents a systematic position on lawyers’ ethics. 
Essentially, it carries forward a traditionalist view of the lawyer’s 
role in an adversary system that is rooted in the Bill of Rights.”11  
This is a fair summary of Freedman’s approach—and a succinct 
one. It reminds me of Harper Lee’s Introduction to the thirty-fifth 
anniversary edition of To Kill a Mockingbird.12 In a few terse 
 
 9. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1990). 
 10. Id. at ix. Freedman writes: 
Students, particularly, should be aware that this book argues one position in a 
continuing and often heated controversy regarding the lawyer’s role. I hope I can 
persuade you to my point of view. Even if you are not persuaded, however, you can 
benefit from the presentation, because it challenges you to come to grips with the 
underlying reasons for the position presented. There is no more effective way to 
achieve a real understanding of legal rules . . . than to test them against your own 
moral standards and reasoned judgment. 
Id.  
 11. Id. (emphasis added). 
 12. HARPER LEE, Foreword to TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (35th anniversary ed. 1995) 
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sentences she basically says the book needs no preface; in sum, it 
speaks for itself.13 
Freedman is an unabashed supporter of adversarial advocacy. He 
describes the adversary system as not simply a model for resolving 
disputes, but as the embodiment of a “core of basic rights that 
recognize and protect the dignity of the individual in a free society.”14 
Indeed, Freedman argues that an essential function of the adversary 
system is to “maintain a free society in which individual rights are 
central.”15 As Freedman notes, the rights that comprise the adversary 
system include the right to personal autonomy, the right to counsel, 
the right to equal protection of the laws, the right to trial by jury, the 
right to call and confront witnesses, the right to be free from 
compelled self-incrimination, and the right to a presumption of 
innocence. Freedman further notes that the government must bear the 
burden of proof, and must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.16  
Freedman regards the right to counsel as the most important of all 
rights because it is inextricably connected to the “client’s ability to 
assert all other rights.”17 Through adversarial advocacy the lawyer 
functions to uphold the client’s rights, and protects the client’s 
autonomy, dignity, and freedom.18 Thus, to Freedman, an ethical and 
 
(1960). Ironically, Monroe Freedman is not a fan of To Kill a Mockingbird, or at least of its 
central character. See Monroe H. Freedman, Atticus Finch—Right and Wrong, 45 ALA. L. REV. 
473 (1994). I disagree with Freedman on this; I like Atticus Finch, both the man and the myth. 
See Abbe Smith, Rosie O’Neill Goes to Law School: The Clinical Education of the Sensitive, 
New Age Defender, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 51-52 (1993) [hereinafter Rosie O’Neill 
Goes to Law School]. 
 13. See Lee, supra note 12, at Foreword (1993):  
Please spare Mockingbird an Introduction. As a reader I loath Introductions. To novels, 
I associate Introductions with long-gone authors and works that are being brought back 
into print after decades of interment. Although Mockingbird will be 33 this year, it has 
never been out of print and I am still alive, although very quiet. Introductions inhibit 
pleasure, they kill the joy of anticipation, they frustrate curiosity. The only good thing 
about Introductions is that in some cases they delay the close to come. Mockingbird 
still says what it has to say; it has managed to survive the years without preamble. 
 14. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 9, at 13. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at 13. 
 17. See id. (citing Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1957). 
 18. FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 15-17. As Freedman notes: “One of the essential values 
of a just society is respect for the dignity of each member of that society.” Id. at 57. 
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professionally responsible lawyer is an ardent civil libertarian who, in 
zealously representing individual clients, also upholds the political 
philosophy underlying the American system of justice.19  
In Freedman’s view, the central concern of a system of lawyers’ 
ethics is to strengthen and protect the role of the lawyer in enhancing 
individual dignity and autonomy through advocacy.20 This is a 
constant theme throughout Freedman’s considerable body of work.21 
To use the phrase currently in vogue, which he himself may have 
coined, Freedman is an eloquent champion of “client-centered” 
lawyering.22 Thus, to Freedman, lawyers do justice when they pursue 
their clients’ interests with devotion and zeal.23 
 
 19. Id. at 13-17. 
 20. Id. at 42. For a slightly different exposition of this same view, see Stephen L. Pepper, 
The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. 
B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (1986) (developing a theory of client autonomy as a justification of 
partisan representation); but see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 
STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984) (questioning whether client autonomy is achievable). 
 21. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 9; MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975); Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal 
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); Monroe H. 
Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191 (1978); 
Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 331 (1987); 
Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer’s Moral Obligation of Justification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 111 
(1995); Monroe H. Freedman, The Ethical Danger of “Civility” and “Professionalism”, 6 
NYSBA CRIM. JUST. J. 17 (1998). 
 22. See generally FREEDMAN, LAWYERS ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 
21, at 43-50; see also FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 9, at 87 
(noting that “the ethic of trust and confidence is client-centered”); Monroe H. Freedman, 
Ethical Ends and Ethical Means, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 55, 56 (1991) (“My view of lawyers’ 
ethics is . . . client-centered, emphasizing the lawyer’s role in enhancing the client’s autonomy 
as a free person in a free society.”). Fred Zacharias also credits Freedman with developing the 
theory of client-centered lawyering. See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and 
Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1319 (1995) (“Monroe Freedman led the 
intellectual development of this theory, characterizing client orientation as a constitutional 
guarantee and as an essential element in upholding the dignity of individuals.”). For clinical 
scholarship on client-centeredness, see, for example, DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS 
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991) [hereinafter BINDER, LAWYERS AS 
COUNSELORS]; DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND 
COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977); DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER 
AND CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE? (1974); Robert M. Bastress, Client Centered Counseling and 
Moral Accountability for Lawyers, 10 J. LEGAL PROF. 97 (1985); Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical 
Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. REV. 697 (1992); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered 
Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990); Stephen Ellmann, 
Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987). 
 
 23. See Monroe H. Freedman, How Lawyers Act in the Interests of Justice, 70 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1717, 1727 (2002) (“In a free society . . . we lawyers act in the interests of justice not 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol11/iss1/5
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My own view of criminal defense lawyering owes much to 
Monroe Freedman. I agree with his “traditionalist view”24 of criminal 
defense ethics as a lawyering paradigm in which zealous advocacy 
and the maintenance of client confidence and trust are paramount. 
Simply put, zeal and confidentiality trump most other rules, 
principles, or values.25 When there is tension between these 
“fundamental principles”26 and other ethical rules, criminal defense 
lawyers must uphold the principles, even in the face of public or 
professional outcry.27 Although a defender must act within the 
 
by acting as a self-appointed moral elite, but by serving our clients zealously within the rule of 
law.”). For criticism of zeal as the foundational principle of legal ethics, see DAVID LUBAN, 
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 50-148 (1988); see also William H. Simon, 
Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988). 
 24. See FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at ix.  
 25. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, “Nice Work If You Can Get It”: “Ethical” Jury Selection in 
Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523 (1998) (arguing that the ethic of zealous defense 
should trump the ideal of racially blind jury selection) [hereinafter Smith, Nice Work If You Can 
Get It]; Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People 
Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925 (2000) (arguing for zealous advocacy on 
behalf of those who commit the most repugnant crimes) [hereinafter Smith, Defending 
Defending]. Criminal defense ethics are a much-considered topic in legal ethics treatises. See, 
e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 244-93 (3d ed. 2001). The 
suggestion that criminal defense ethics can be reduced to zeal and confidentiality may seem 
unduly simplistic. Still, there is solace in simplicity. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as 
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 8-9 (1975): 
The job of the lawyer . . . is not to approve or disapprove of the character of his or her 
client, the cause for which the client seeks the lawyer’s assistance, or the avenues 
provided by the law to achieve that which the client wants to accomplish. The lawyer’s 
task is, instead, to provide that competence which the client lacks and the lawyer, as 
professional, possesses. In this way, the lawyer as professional comes to inhabit a 
simplified universe . . . .  
 [A] simplified, intellectual world is . . . often a very comfortable one to inhabit. 
 26. See FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 65, 87-88. For a discussion of “principlism” as an 
approach to legal ethics, see Paul Trembly, The New Casuistry, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489, 
503-08 (1999). 
 27. Lord Brougham provided the classic statement of this ideal: 
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and 
that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all 
hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only 
duty: and in performing his duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the 
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that 
of an advocate, he must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his 
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.  
See FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 65-66 (quoting TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (Joseph 
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bounds of the law,28 he or she should engage in advocacy that is as 
 
Nightingale ed., 1821)); see also Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 
4 (1951-52) (noting approvingly that Brougham’s idea of advocacy “has become the classic 
statement of the loyalty which a lawyer owes to his client. . . .”); ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE 
BEST DEFENSE xv n.* (1982) (quoting Brougham with favor and noting that zealous advocacy 
is “neither a radical nor a transient notion”).  Monroe Freedman offers his own version: “Let 
justice be done—that is, for my client let justice be done—though the heavens fall. That is the 
kind of representation that I would want as a client, and it is what I feel bound to provide as a 
lawyer.” FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 66. Alan Dershowitz has his: “Once I decide to take a 
case, I have only one agenda: I want to win. I will try, by every fair and legal means, to get my 
client off—without regard to the consequences.” DERSHOWITZ, supra at xv. 
 For legal scholarship criticizing Brougham’s concept of advocacy, see Albert W. 
Alschuler, How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of Lord Brougham and the O.J. 
Simpson Defense Team, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 291, 317 (1998) [hereinafter Alschuler, The 
Ethics of Lord Brougham]; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in 
a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996); David B. Wilkins, 
Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1990); Deborah L. Rhode, 
Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665 (1994); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical 
Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985); Simon, Ethical Discretion in 
Lawyering, supra note 23; Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303 (1995); Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional 
Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980). 
 28. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980) [hereinafter MODEL 
CODE] (“A lawyer shall represent his client zealously within the bounds of law.”). Cf. MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (1999) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]: 
A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and 
with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf. However, a lawyer is not bound to 
press for every advantage that might be realized by a client A lawyer has professional 
discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. 
 My approach to the phrase “within the bounds of law” is primarily pragmatic. I would not 
want to engage in conduct that would jeopardize my ability to practice law and serve clients. 
See GEOFFREY COWAN, THE PEOPLE V. CLARENCE DARROW (1993) (recounting and examining 
Clarence Darrow’s 1912 prosecution for allegedly bribing a juror in the course of defending 
labor union activists accused of murder); Fredric Dannen, Defending the Mafia, THE NEW 
YORKER, Feb. 21, 1994, at 64 (examining the law practice and legal troubles of Gerald Shargel, 
a prominent criminal lawyer who often represents alleged members of organized crime). 
 Though mindful of the bounds of law, I will not cower in the face of unjust law, but will 
test and challenge it. See, e.g., Smith, Nice Work If You Can Get It, supra note 25, at 531 
(arguing that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and Georgia v. McCollum, 507 U.S. 16 
(1993), require criminal defenders to abandon their ethical obligation of zealous advocacy); see 
also J. ANTHONY LUKAS, BIG TROUBLE 325 (1997) (noting that Clarence Darrow’s “principal 
allegiance had never been to the law itself [because of its] ‘cant and hypocrisy’” and quoting 
Darrow: “‘The law? . . . To hell with the law! My business is to save this defendant from the 
law!’”). 
 Of course, historical context is critical. Notwithstanding Clarence Darrow’s acquittal of 
bribery, he may well have committed the offense and believed his conduct justified: “‘Do not 
the rich and powerful bribe juries, intimidate and coerce judges as well as juries? . . . . Why this 
theatrical indignation against alleged or actual jury tampering in behalf of “lawless” strikers or 
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close to the line as possible, and, indeed, should test the line, if it is in 
the client’s interest in doing so.29 
It is important to note that no matter how far a defender is willing 
to go to pursue an accused’s interests, or to maintain his or her 
confidence and trust,30 this approach is consistent with the 
traditionalist, or “Freedmanian” view. As a defense lawyer, I have 
often derived comfort and support from Freedman’s writings on legal 
ethics, and on more than one occasion from Monroe Freedman 
himself by cell phone in the thick of trial. I know that I am not alone 
in this regard. His often “lonely battle to prevent the subversion of 
the adversarial quest for justice”31 has emboldened and ennobled 
 
other unfortunate victims of ruthless capitalism?’” Id. Criminal defense at the millennium has 
its own context. See generally DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999) (discussing persistently race and class-based law 
enforcement); see also MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999) (discussing the over-
incarceration of a generation of Americans). 
 29. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE AND THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 145 (1996) (“What a defense attorney ‘may’ do, he must do, if it is 
necessary to defend his client. A zealous defense attorney has a professional obligation to take 
every legal and ethically permissible step that will serve the client’s best interest . . . .”). Of 
course, it is ethically permissible to take a legal position or pursue a strategy that is creative or 
contrary to existing law. See MODEL RULES, supra note 28, R. 3.1 (2000). A lawyer may 
always make a “good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” 
Id. 
 30. I have argued that it is ethically defensible to put forward a defense theory that 
exploits racism, sexism, homophobia, or ethnic bias, see Smith, Defending Defending, supra 
note 25, at 948-57; a defense theory that has scant support in the record, id. at 948; and a 
defense theory that perpetuates racial stereotypes, see Abbe Smith Burdening the Least of Us: 
“Race-Conscious Ethics” in Criminal Defense, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1585 (1999). I have also 
argued that it is ethical to engage in race or sex-based jury selection. See generally Smith, 
”Nice Work If You Can Get It,” supra note 25. I have even argued that it is ethical to 
aggressively cross-examine truthful rape complainants though it might pain the complainant 
and perpetuate sexism. See Smith, Rosie O’Neill Goes to Law School, supra note 12, at 42-45. 
 31. Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: The Case Against the 
Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV. 339, 339 n.* (1994).  
 Critics have roundly attacked Freedman for his theory of lawyers’ ethics. See FREEDMAN, 
supra note 9, at ix. The typical charge is that Freedman is an advocate of “extreme 
partisanship.” Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 169, 
169 n.5 (1997); see also Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction in Professional 
Responsibility, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 166 n.6 (1996) [hereinafter Zacharias, The 
Civil-Criminal Distinction] (calling Freedman “the guru of proponents of super-aggressive 
lawyering”).  
 
 Like many defenders, I am unmoved by complaints of extreme partisanship or so-called 
“overzealousness.” See DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE, supra note 27, at 410 (“I have been 
accused several times of overzealousness. I confess my guilt. In a world full of underzealous, 
lazy, and incompetent defense lawyers, I am proud to be regarded as overzealous. . . .”). 
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many lonely adversarial advocates. 
The only issue I take with Freedman is within his Preface to 
Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics, in which he claims that “[f]or the 
most part,” his approach “also corresponds to the ethical standards 
that are observed in practice by a large proportion of the bar.”32 
Unfortunately, this statement may not be accurate. My chief concern 
about indigent criminal defense is that most criminal lawyers do not 
engage in zealous advocacy and too often betray client confidences, 
sometimes for so-called “moral” reasons, but mostly out of 
institutional expedience or laziness.33 There are also structural 
reasons: too few resources, too many clients, and fee systems that 
discourage zealous advocacy.34  
As Professor David Luban has noted, the right to counsel “is 
hardly an entitlement to robust advocacy,”35 and often means nothing 
more than a “warm body” seated beside a defendant.36 Actually, a 
warm body might be benign compared to some of the dangerous, 
dim-witted defenders that roam the criminal courts.37 Sadly, the 
 
Partisanship and zeal are well-established components of the adversarial ethic, especially in a 
criminal context. See DEBORAH C. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 49-80 (2000). In my view, there is no such thing as overzealous 
representation. There is zealous representation such as a lawyer using lawful means to achieve a 
client’s lawful ends, and there is conduct outside the bounds of law. See MODEL CODE, supra 
note 28, Canon 7-1; MODEL RULES, supra note 28, R. 1.3 cmt. As Freedman has noted, the 
answer to how far an advocate should go in any given situation is often more “tactical” than 
ethical. See FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 74.  
 32. FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at ix. 
 33. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1762-
63 (1993). 
 34. See RHODE, supra note 31, at 60-63. 
 35. Luban, supra note 33, at 1759. 
 36. Id. at 1740. Luban portrays “a world of lawyers for whom no defense at all, rather 
than aggressive defense or even desultory defense, is the norm . . . .” Id. at 1762; see also 
Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet A “Walking Violation of the Sixth 
Amendment,” If You’re Trying to Put That Lawyer’s Client in Jail?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 
1029 (2000) (noting the “low, low threshold for effective assistance”); Alan Berlow, Requiem 
for a Public Defender, AMERICAN PROSPECT, June 5, 2000, at 28 (noting that the “Supreme 
Court has . . . [set] a standard of competence for attorneys so ridiculously low that trained circus 
bears very nearly qualify.”). This is hardly a new phenomenon. See David Bazelon, Defective 
Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973) (noting that, since taking the bench in 
1950, he has seen few indigent defendants receive effective assistance of counsel, something 
“the criminal justice system goes to considerable lengths to bury”). 
 37.  Professor Vanessa Merton brilliantly depicts one of these defenders in a recent 
article: 
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promise of Gideon v. Wainwright,38 that “every [person] charged with 
a crime will be capably defended, no matter what his economic 
circumstances, and in which the lawyer representing him will do so 
proudly, without resentment at an unfair burden, sure of the support 
needed to make an adequate defense,”39 remains unfulfilled.40 
III. THE RECENT INCLUSION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN THE CRITIQUE 
OF ADVERSARIAL ADVOCACY  
In the past two decades, there has been a growing challenge to the 
traditional conception of adversarial advocacy. The main criticism is 
that adversarial advocacy is too adversarial; it needs to be softened 
or at least modulated. The critics argue that, in order for things to 
change, lawyers need to stop being so client-centered: If lawyers 
refrained from pursuing every lawful avenue in advancing a client’s 
 
All along, he had been leaning against a wall, scribbling with a pencil on a stack of 
files. He had no briefcase or satchel or backpack to hold a handy CPL or Penal Law. 
He was, to put it politely, unkempt: flushed, perspiring, uncombed, unshaven, shirt-
tails hanging out of his trousers. My first thought was he must be unusually dedicated 
to come to court when he was so obviously sick with the flu. 
 As it developed, that didn’t seem to be the problem . . . .  
 “OK, here it is—Sanchez, yeah, another car thief. Probably young, though, you 
know? Maybe not such a bad kid—maybe he does it to support his dear mother. (Head 
thrown back, in a gleeful guffaw over his own wit.) What are you looking for? These 
guys don’t care if they get a conviction as long as there’s no jail. How ‘bout a fine? He 
can always steal another car to pay it.” (Another raucous guffaw that descended into a 
giggle. Then he started working on something in his ear.) 
Merton, supra note 36, at 1007-08 (footnotes omitted).  
 38. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  
 39. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 205 (1964). 
 40. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst 
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1837 (1994) (“More than sixty years 
after Powell and thirty years after Gideon, this task remains uncompleted, the dream 
unrealized.”); see also Randy Bellows, Notes of a Public Defender, in PHILLIP B. HEYMANN 
AND LANCE LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 96 (1988): 
[Many court appointed lawyers] simply do not care. They do not investigate. They do 
not file motions They do not talk to their clients. They do not think through a defense, 
prepare an opening statement, subpoena witnesses, or do any of the other myriad tasks 
necessary to adequate representation. Sometimes on the day of trial, they cannot even 
recognize their clients. For a prosecutor, trying a case against one of these lawyers is 
like shooting fish in a barrel. 
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interests, and instead considered the interests of third parties and the 
public, the legal merit of a client’s position, and concepts such as 
“morality” and “justice,” then we would all be better off.41 There are 
many legal scholars, far more scholars than practitioners, who 
express variations of this view.42 Although scholarly critiques of 
adversarial advocacy have generally exempted criminal defense,43 
there are still several prominent scholars who challenge this 
exemption. Most of these scholars have been longstanding critics of 
 
 41. For a good example of this view as it has evolved, see WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE 
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1998) [hereinafter SIMON, THE 
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE]; William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 217 (1996); William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
1703, 1703 (1993); Simon, supra note 23; William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: 
Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29. Simon believes that not 
only would such a revised, “justice-oriented” professional ethic further social justice, it would 
make lawyers happier and more fulfilled. Id. at 109-37. 
 42. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN 
CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995) (urging a focus on victims); LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra 
note 23 (arguing against lawyers viewing role obligations as trumping ordinary moral 
sentiments); RHODE, supra note 31, at 81-115 (arguing against adversarial excess and in favor 
of more “truth” and “justice”); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 2227 (2001) (arguing against the use of race and “racialized narratives” in criminal trials); 
Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995) (same); 
Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 1063 (1997) [hereinafter Alfieri, Lynching Ethics]; Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Race-ing an 
Ethic of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 935 (1999) (same); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. 
L. REV. 1293 (1998) (same); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible In Lawyering? 8 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 385 (1992) (arguing for rejecting the adversary paradigm in favor of 
altruistic lawyering); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a 
Postmodern, Multicultural World, supra note 27 (arguing the limits of adversarial advocacy); 
see also Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665 (1994); 
David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1990); Zacharias, supra 
note 22; John J. Flynn, Professional Ethics and the Lawyer’s Duty to Self, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 
429 ; Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 
(1980); Wasserstrom, supra note 25, at 9-15. A prominent former federal judge also wrote an 
important, oft-cited critique of adversarial excess. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 
(1980). 
 43. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 25, at 12: 
I do believe that the amoral behavior of the criminal defense lawyer is justifiable . . . . 
But this does not, however, justify a comparable perspective on the part of lawyers 
generally. Once we leave the peculiar situation of the criminal defense lawyer, I think 
it quite likely that the role-differentiated amorality of the lawyer is almost certainly 
excessive and at times inappropriate. 
See also Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 605 
(1985). 
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zealous advocacy in criminal defense, so their argument against a 
criminal defense exemption is not entirely new or unexpected. I will 
briefly discuss the work of three of these scholars.  
William Simon 
Chief among those who reject the criminal defense exemption is 
Professor William Simon, who, in his 1993 essay, The Ethics of 
Criminal Defense,44 and 1998 book The Practice of Justice,45 
extended his critique of the adversarial ethic in legal practice46 to 
criminal defense. In these two works and others, Simon urges a 
unified system of ethics, the primary focus of which is the pursuit of 
“justice,” regardless of the field of practice.47  
To Simon, justice is a normative concept, not unduly subjective, 
and readily apparent to lawyers.48 Though other people may find the 
meaning of justice elusive,49 Simon believes that lawyers know 
justice when they see it,50 or at least have the means to know it.51 
 
 44. See William Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993). 
 45. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 41. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. at 1-25. For a characteristically thoughtful critique of Simon’s THE PRACTICE 
OF JUSTICE, see David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873 
(1999). 
 48. For a critique of Simon’s concept of justice from a communal and biblical perspective, 
see Thomas L. Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Sign Up for Simon’s Practice of Justice?, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 903 (1999). 
 49. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No 
Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 
449 (1997) (noting that “larger macro justice issues do not lend themselves easily to rule or 
standard drafting”); see also Stanley Fish, Condemnation Without Absolutes, N.Y. TIMES, 
October 15, 2001, at A23 (arguing in favor of postmodern relativism even after the events of 
September 11, and noting that “invoking the abstract notions of justice . . . to support our cause 
wouldn’t be effective . . . because our adversaries lay claim to the same language.”).  
 50. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating 
with reference to hard core pornography, the now famous test, “I know it when I see it.”). 
 51. Simon avers that justice is “the basic value[] of the legal system.” SIMON, THE 
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 138. Yet, others would argue that the basic values of 
the legal system are individual dignity and liberty and that these values are client-centered, not 
justice-centered values. See FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 13-42 (discussing the adversary 
system). Simon refines his definition somewhat: “Decisions about justice are . . . . legal 
judgments grounded in the methods and sources of authority of the professional culture. I use 
‘justice’ interchangeably with ‘legal merit.’” SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, 
at 138. It is this justice that Simon believes lawyers are uniquely equipped to determine. See id. 
at 18. Legal merit, however, is not always clear-cut. See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE 
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Accordingly, he cedes discretion to individual lawyers to determine 
justice in their law practice.52  
Simon believes that lawyers perpetuate injustice when they 
engage in the standard adversary ethic, pursuing client interests 
without heeding the interests of others.53 He dismisses the idea that 
lawyers serve individual clients in order to promote the dignity of the 
individual in a free society and thus to facilitate our constitutional 
system of justice.54 Simon believes the chief problem with law 
practice, both civil and criminal, is that the practical tasks of 
lawyering cause injustice in the name of an increasingly abstract and 
“remote” justice.55  
Simon disparages the idea that criminal defense is different in any 
meaningful respect from civil law practice, thereby justifying a more 
aggressive level of advocacy.56 He argues his position both 
empirically and theoretically.57 He dismisses as empty rhetoric the 
suggestion that the state is an enormously powerful adversary that 
needs to be kept in check, because by his assessment there is no state, 
only “harassed, overworked bureaucrats.”58 Further, he rejects 
arguments that criminal defense is different because of its unique role 
in upholding individual dignity, equality, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and the burden of proof.59 Moreover, he is even 
reluctant to admit that criminal punishment is different from civil 
 
JURY (1995) (analyzing the American jury system and several high profile trials from the 
perspective of democratic theory). Moreover, as Richard Wasserstrom points out, there are 
good reasons to “charge the defense counsel with the job of making the best possible case for 
the accused—without regard . . . for the merits. . . .” Wasserstrom, supra note 25, at 12 
(emphasis added). 
 52. See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 138-69; see also Alschuler, 
supra note 27, at 960 (proposing that a lawyer should not be “obliged to do everything helpful 
to a client that ethical rules . . . allow” but should instead “exercise a sound, independent 
judgment concerning the propriety of the means that he or she employs on a client’s behalf.”). 
 53. See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 4. 
 54. See id. at 26-52. 
 55. Id. at 2. 
 56. See Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 41, at 1707-22.  
 57. For a strong rebuttal, see Luban, supra note 33. 
 58. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 41, at 1707-78; cf. Luban, supra 
note 33, at 1735 (“‘The state’ is not just a group of harassed, overworked bureaucrats in the 
D.A.’s office. It is a group of harassed, overworked bureaucrats, backed by the police and able 
in many cases to immobilize their adversaries in cold concrete.”).  
 59. See Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 41, at 1713-22. 
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compensation.60  
Simon has a skewed picture of the typical players in the criminal 
justice system. Instead of the destitute defendant with an 
“overburdened and underprepared” court-appointed lawyer,61 Simon 
sees O.J. Simpson—or maybe Tony Soprano62—with a herd of well-
paid lawyers.63 Instead of looking to the vast army of state and 
federal prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, and attendant 
investigators, scientists, and consultants, Simon sees Larry Kramer, 
the endlessly put-upon prosecutor in Tom Wolfe’s The Bonfire of the 
Vanities.64 This is not the reality.65  
Simon believes that if, in fact, the majority of the accused are 
poorly defended, then the answer is greater restraint, not greater 
zeal.66 In other words, if criminal defense lawyers were nicer people, 
the public would be willing to adequately fund criminal defense. This 
proposition seems unlikely. First, the “good-faith factual defense” 
that Simon pines for is a defense that is supported by evidence, or 
lack thereof, and not a defense that avoids offending anyone.67 
 
 60. See id. at 1721-22. 
 61. RHODE, supra note 31, at 61. See also Jay S. Silver, Equality of Arms and the 
Adversarial Process: A New Constitutional Right, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (suggesting 
the “paradigm” of the indigent, twenty-one-year-old defendant with an IQ of 86). 
 62. Tony Soprano is the fictional head of both a mafia and suburban family in New Jersey 
in a popular HBO series. The Sopranos (Home Box Office). 
 63. See Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 41, at 1714 (referring to the 
“skilled henchmen” of rich murderers). 
 64. TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 29-48 (1987). 
 65. See RHODE, supra note 31, at 61 (“In the courtrooms that the public sees, zealous 
advocacy is the norm. O.J. Simpson’s lawyers left no stone unturned. But they were charging 
by the stone. Most defense counsel cannot.”); Luban, supra note 33, 1730-1744, 1762-1766 
(noting the “two worlds” of criminal defense, one for poor clients with overburdened public 
counsel and the other for moneyed clients with high-priced private counsel); see also Berlow, 
supra note 36, at 28 (quoting Nancy Gist, director of the Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice 
Assistance: “‘[T]he level of quality representation provided indigent defendants is uneven and 
frequently abysmal.’”).  
 66. See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 193: 
Whether we can secure support for an increase in defense resources depends in part on 
what people think additional resources will be used for. If the extra resources will fund 
efforts to substantiate good-faith factual defenses, many will feel quite differently 
about them than if they will fund efforts to uncover evidence to impeach truthful 
witnesses. 
Id. 
 67. See MODEL RULES, supra note 28, R. 3.1 cmt. and DR 7-102(A)(1) (allowing a 
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Second, the practice of impeaching a truthful witness has been 
around for a long time and is not something about which the public is 
newly exorcized.68 Third, the underfunding of criminal defense is not 
because of the behavior of defense counsel, but instead results from 
the behavior of those they represent. 
In The Ethics of Criminal Defense, Simon criticizes defense 
lawyers for routinely engaging in overly aggressive and “ethically 
questionable” practices69 such as delaying a case in order to frustrate 
government witnesses,70 presenting perjured testimony by 
defendants,71 arguing an inference known to be false,72 and 
embarrassing or blaming alleged victims.73 As Simon acknowledges, 
however, many reputable lawyers and scholars view such tactics as 
ethical and justifiable both as a matter of law and social justice,74 no 
 
criminal defense lawyer to “put the prosecution to its proof even if there is no reasonable basis 
for defense”); see also Smith, Defending Defending, supra note 25. 
 68. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 82 (1949) (noting that “the great Wigmore” 
endorsed a book that instructs lawyers on how to make truthful witnesses appear untruthful).  
 69. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 44, at 1705. 
 70. See id. at 1704. 
 71. Id. Simon joins a long line of legal scholars who believe that perjury by criminal 
defendants is widespread and threatens the integrity of the legal system. But see Silver, supra 
note 31 (disputing that client perjury is an ethical “dilemma” and arguing that client perjury 
rules cause more harm than good). Simon offers no evidence of the frequency of defendant 
perjury or its effect. Simon is not similarly concerned about police perjury, which he 
acknowledges is “widespread,” and is arguably more pernicious. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal 
Defense, supra note 41, at 1711, n.15. Indeed, Simon offers an excuse for police perjury, 
explaining it as a “police and prosecutorial response to strict federal court decisions on search-
and-seizure issues.” Id. For discussions of police perjury in legal scholarship, see FREEDMAN, 
supra note 21, at 91-93; Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311 (1994); 
Stanley Z. Fisher, “Just the Facts, Ma’am”: Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence 
in Police Reports, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1993); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, 
and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 75 (1992); see also PAUL CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEW YORK 
CITY (1969). 
 72. See Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 41, at 1717-19. 
 73. Id. at 1704-22. Simon concedes that the tactics he refers to are not prohibited. See id. 
at 1704. Moreover, his portrayal of criminal advocacy largely omits the fact that there is an 
opposing party. Prosecutors routinely anticipate and counter delay, untruthful testimony, 
implausible arguments, and victim/witness bashing. See JAMES S. KUNEN, “HOW CAN YOU 
DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE?”: THE MAKING OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER 256 (1983) (“I do think it’s 
better to be overzealous than underzealous. Overzealousness can be corrected by the 
prosecution. . . . Underzealousness cannot be corrected by anyone.”). 
 74. See Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 41, at 1722-28 (discussing 
Stanford Law Professor Barbara Babcock’s “social worker” justification for aggressive 
defense). Babcock offers several justifications for zealous criminal defense. See generally 
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matter how “personally distasteful” to some.75 
As My Fair Lady’s Henry Higgins laments in the song Why Can’t 
a Woman Be More Like a Man?,76 Simon wants a defense lawyer to 
be more like a prosecutor. He believes that defenders, like 
prosecutors, should pursue justice.77 It is interesting to note that 
prosecutors are the one group of lawyers who are ethically obligated 
to do what Simon is proposing for the rest of the bar.78 Indeed, Simon 
acknowledges that his formulation of what he calls the “Discretionary 
 
Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175 (1983-84). 
 75. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS, supra note 29, at 145. 
 76. Alan Jay Lerner & Frederick Loewe, Why Can’t a Woman Be More Like a Man, in 
MY FAIR LADY (1956). 
 77. See MODEL CODE, supra note 28, EC 7-13 “The responsibility of a public prosecutor 
differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict”); 
MODEL RULES, supra note 28, R. 3.8 cmt. (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of 
justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW: THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97, cmt. h (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (noting the prosecutor’s 
obligation to protect the rights of the guilty as well as the innocent); STANDARDS RELATING TO 
THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. JUST. § 3-1.2(c) (1980) [hereinafter STANDARDS] (describing the 
prosecutor’s role as “quasi-judicial”); see also Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek 
Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The 
Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 1030 (2000); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring 
the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 
(1991); H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance 
from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (1973). For the prosecutor’s duty to uphold the truth, as 
well as justice, see Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 309 (2001). 
 For a forceful argument against imposing a duty to seek justice on non-prosecuting 
attorneys, see James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer of 
the Court,” 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 350 (2000) (arguing that changing the attorney’s role from 
“agent for a client” to “agent for ‘justice’” would lead to a “system [in which] the lawyer . . . 
substitute[s] her moral beliefs for her client’s lawful instructions”). As Cohen points out, 
lawyers who pursue “justice” on the backs of clients do them a serious disservice. See also 
Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116, 154-
56 (1990) (arguing that David Luban’s proposal to limit cross-examination of rape 
complainants gives individual lawyers a “troubling . . . breadth of . . . authority . . . to weigh an 
innocent person’s defense against political considerations” and approves the “blatant use of the 
lawyer’s power over the client”); HON. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL 
ETHICS (5th ed. 1896) (arguing that lawyers should not “usurp the functions of both judge and 
jury”). 
 In countries where the role of the defense lawyer is more like that of the prosecutor, the 
results have not been good. See RHODE, supra note 31, at 54.  
 78. See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 10. (“Another pertinent 
context in which lawyers have been relatively willing to accept the possibility of meaningful 
discretionary judgment is the arena of the public prosecutor.”); see also Fred C. Zacharias, 
Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of 
Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223 (1993). 
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model” has been inspired by the maxim that the Model Code 
prescribes for prosecutors: namely, to seek justice.79 Yet, Simon fails 
to acknowledge that, despite the maxim, the prosecutorial record for 
doing justice is hardly impressive.80  
Harry Subin 
Professor Harry Subin may have been the first prominent legal 
scholar to argue against the idea that criminal defense is different. In 
his 1987 article, The Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission”: 
Reflections on the “Right” to Present a False Case,81 Subin argues 
that, contrary to Justice White’s oft-cited opinion about the different 
ethical duties of criminal defense lawyers,82 defense lawyers ought to 
 
 79. See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 10. 
 80. See generally Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and 
the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393 (2001). For a recent study documenting the failure 
of prosecutors to do justice, see JAMES LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN & VALERIE WEST, A 
BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995 (2000) (finding that between 
1975 and 1993, two out of three capital convictions were reversed, with prosecutorial 
misconduct being a significant factor); see also Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & 
Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at 3 (reporting that 
convictions in 381 homicide cases nationwide have been reversed because prosecutors 
concealed evidence suggesting innocence or presented evidence they knew to be false). For the 
author’s view of prosecutors’ ability to do justice, see Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person 
and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 375-91 (2001) (arguing that, in 
practice, the prosecutor’s duty to seek justice is empty and self-serving). For a thoughtful 
former prosecutor’s view, see Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 
393, 445 (1992) (“[T]he standards regulating prosecutorial behavior—i.e., to ‘seek justice’—are 
often so nebulous as to be unenforceable. . . .”); see also Paul Butler, Starr Is to Clinton as 
Regular Prosecutors Are to Blacks, 40 B.C. L. REV. 705 (1999) (arguing that prosecutors 
regularly engage in selective prosecution, abuse of discretion, and excessive zeal for 
punishment with black defendants). 
 Simon also suggests that judges do justice by exercising “rational, grounded, discretionary 
judgment.” See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 10. Yet, the fact that “the 
judicial role requires the intelligent, context-sensitive exercise of discretionary judgment,” 
Luban, supra note 47, at 884, does not mean that most judges exercise their judgment in this 
way.  
 81. Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission”: Reflections on the 
“Right” to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987) [hereinafter The 
Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission”]. 
 82. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part) (describing the defense lawyer’s “different mission”). Justice White believes 
that, in contrast to the ethical obligation of prosecutors to pursue the truth, it is the duty of 
“honorable” defense lawyers to subvert the truth: 
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be held to at least the same standard of truth-telling as civil 
practitioners.83 He rejects the idea that criminal defense lawyers 
should be allowed to subvert the truth in order to preserve the 
adversary system,84 or to protect individual rights and dignity.85 He 
argues that criminal defense lawyers, like all lawyers, have an 
obligation as officers of the court to refrain from presenting a “false” 
case86 or to otherwise “manipulate the truth.”87 He goes further by 
arguing that the defense function should largely be that of a 
“monitor” of the system, assuring that convictions are based on 
adequate and admissible evidence, instead of that of an advocate 
seeking to undermine the system.88 
 
The State has the obligation to present evidence. Defense counsel need present 
nothing, even if he knows what the truth is. He need not furnish any witnesses to the 
police, or reveal any confidences of his client, or furnish any other information to help 
the prosecution’s case. If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him 
appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal course. Our 
interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the State to its proof, to 
put the State’s case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks or knows 
to be the truth. 
Id. at 257-58. 
 83. See Subin, supra note 81, at 125-26: 
I limit my inquiry to criminal practice because this field is most frequently cited to 
justify the use of truth defeating devices for the higher purpose of preserving the 
adversary system, our defense against overreaching by the state . . . . [C]ivil lawyers 
ride the ethical coattails of the criminal lawyer on this issue. If, as I shall argue, the 
criminal lawyer should not be permitted to impede arriving at a truthful verdict to the 
extent he or she can today, then similar claims by civil lawyers would be weaker still. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 84. See Subin, supra note 81, at 136-38; see also Harry I. Subin, Is This Lie Necessary? 
Further Reflections on the Right to Present a False Defense, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 689, 689 
(1988) [hereinafter Is This Lie Necessary?] (arguing that lawyers should not be permitted to 
“inject ‘disinformation’ in order to win over the jury”). 
 85. See Subin, supra note 81, at 143-49. Like Simon, Subin questions whether the state is 
really such a fierce opponent, and whether prevailing against the state is a good thing in most 
cases. See id. at 149. 
 86. By false case, or, more specifically “false defense,” Subin means “attempting to 
convince the judge or jury that facts established by the state and known to the attorney to be 
true are not true, or that facts known to the attorney to be false are true.” Id. at 126. 
 87. Id. at 152. 
 88. See id. at 144-47. For an effective rebuttal, see John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts 
Are Where You Find Them: A Response to Professor Subin’s Position on the Criminal Lawyer’s 
“Different Mission”, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 339 (1987); see also Monroe H. Freedman, 
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 
MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1471 (1966) (“Effective trial advocacy requires that the attorney’s every 
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Contrary to Simon, who was never a criminal lawyer,89 Subin’s 
opinion seems to come from his discomfort in representing the 
criminally accused after years as a prosecutor.90 The inspiration for 
The Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission” was Subin’s 
representation of an alleged rapist who turned out to be both guilty 
and a liar. Even though Subin was in a position to uncover the truth 
of the allegation only because he was his client’s advocate and 
agent,91 Subin believes that his client’s defense ought to be limited by 
the truth.92 Notwithstanding the adversarial nature of the system,93 or 
the viability of a particular defense theory,94 Subin argues that the 
practice of perpetrating a falsehood through witnesses or argument 
exceeds the bounds of proper advocacy.95 Although Subin does not 
take a position on aspects of zealous criminal defense other than 
subversion of truth, he shares Simon’s feeling that there ought to be 
limits on what a criminal lawyer may do to advance a client’s 
interests because of the effect on “justice.”96  
 
word, action, and attitude be consistent with the conclusion that his client is innocent.”). 
 89. Simon apparently handled one criminal case in his legal career. See William H. 
Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 217 
(1991) [hereinafter Mrs. Jones’s Case]. Subin acknowledges his debt to Simon by beginning 
The Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission” with a quote from Simon’s influential article, The 
Ideology of Advocacy, see supra note 41. 
 90. See THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1028 (West Group & Foundation 
Press 2000-2001). Subin had expressed his discomfort with the ethics of criminal defense prior 
to writing The Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission.” See generally Harry I. Subin, The 
Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 
1091 (1985) (arguing in favor of disclosing the confidences of clients who threaten harm to 
others). 
 91. See Cohen, supra note 77, at 387-408. 
 92. See Subin, supra note 81, at 149. 
 93. See FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 14 (“The [adversary] contest by its very nature is not 
one in which the objective of either side, or of both together, is to expose ‘the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth.’”). 
 94. Subin describes a case with a viable theory of consent: the rape happened in the 
defendant’s apartment; the complainant was not visibly bruised, had declined at least one 
opportunity to flee, and seemed more concerned about a missing watch than the alleged rape; 
and the client had made no statements to the police inconsistent with consent. See Subin, supra 
note 81, at 129-36. 
 95. Id. at 128. 
 96. See Subin, supra note 81, at 135: 
I was prepared to . . . fool the jurors into believing a wholly fabricated story. . . . I was 
also prepared to demand an acquittal because the state had not met its burden of proof 
when, if it had not, it would have been because I made the truth look like a lie. If  there  
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Subin’s position has broad implications and is based on a 
surprisingly run-of-the-mill factual scenario, one that conveniently 
involves a violent crime by an arrogant and devious offender.97 
Although Subin maintains that he would not allow anyone to put on a 
false defense no matter the crime or the accused’s guilt or 
innocence,98 the fundamental principle he advances, truth, is not 
necessarily well-served by consistency. For example, Subin even 
goes so far as to say that in a mistaken identification case he would 
refuse to impeach a near-sighted witness who states that she wore 
glasses at the time of the crime.99 Here, Subin reveals that he is 
simply not cut out to be a defense lawyer. Would he really fail to 
employ a lawful, prosaic means in order to vindicate an innocent 
client,100 or a client facing an excessively harsh sentence,101 or one 
 
is any redeeming social value in permitting an attorney to do such things, I frankly 
cannot discern it. 
See also id. at 125 (referring to the “superior moral claim of the client’s victim”); but see Curtis, 
supra note 27, at 12 (“[A] lawyer has to tell himself strange things on his way to court. But they 
are strange only to those who do not distinguish between truth and justice. Justice is something 
larger and more intimate than truth.”). 
 97. See id. at 130-34 (recounting the client’s initial claim that he was some place else at 
the time of the offense, along with his subsequent attempt to offer an alibi witness). As Subin 
recalls, he was not happy with his client’s antics: 
I was incredulous. I reminded him that at no time during our earlier conversations had 
he indicated what was plainly a crucial piece of information, despite my not too subtle 
explanation of the elements of an alibi defense. I told him that when the aunt was 
initially interviewed with great care on this point, she stated that he was not with her at 
the time of the crime. Ultimately, I told him that I thought he was lying . . . . 
Id. at 133. Subin later acknowledges that he chose this case intentionally because of the 
disturbing facts and describes his client as a “no-good rapist.” Subin, Is This Lie Necessary?, 
supra note 84, at 690 n.9.  
 98. See id. (stating that he would disallow a false defense on behalf of a daughter stealing 
a $1.79 Christmas ornament to cheer her dying mother); Subin, supra note 81, at 143 n.84 (“[A] 
false defense is just as objectionable in my view if the defendant is innocent.”). 
 99. See Subin, supra note 81, at 150 n.113. 
 100. See generally Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN. L. REV. 485 (2000) 
(examining the “grueling and frightening” experience of defending the factually innocent) 
(quoting Babcock, supra note 74, at 180). Of course, I do not mean to suggest that only the 
innocent deserve a devoted, zealous defense. See Smith, Defending Defending, supra note 25. 
Seasoned defenders know, as Subin apparently does not, that there are many motivations for 
zealously defending the accused. See generally Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: 
Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (1993); Babcock, 
supra note 74.  
 101. See, e.g., Babcock, supra note 74, at 178-79 (recounting her defense of an indigent 
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who committed a crime under mitigating circumstances?102 If Subin 
were representing a factually innocent client, the truth of the client’s 
innocence would surely trump the truth of whether or not a witness 
was wearing corrective lenses.103  
In contrast to Subin’s blanket approach, Simon’s more 
“contextual” approach to legal ethics104 suggests that guilt or 
innocence, the nature of the crime, and the fairness of punishment 
might make a difference in whether he considers that the advocacy is 
ethical.105 Simon is, at least, concerned about the legitimacy of a 
system that disproportionately imposes harsh punishment on poor 
minorities, further alienating and disfranchising them,106 and notes 
that discriminatory law enforcement perpetuates the same 
problems.107 Given Subin’s admiration of Simon,108 and his professed 
general belief in the importance of zealous defense,109 it would be 
interesting to know what advocacy Subin would employ on behalf of 
the victim of a racially motivated hoax, such as the one perpetrated in 
 
drug addict who faced twenty years for possession of heroin). 
 102. See generally Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry 
Young Men: Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 433 (1994). Subin asserts that he would “no doubt have a passionate argument to make 
. . . at sentencing” in such a case. See Subin, Is This Lie Necessary?, supra note 84, at 690 n. 9. 
 103. See Subin, Is This Lie Necessary?, supra note 84, at 701 (suggesting that trials ought 
to be reserved for the innocent or at least the not guilty). 
 104. See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 195-215. 
 105. Compare Subin, supra note 81, at 149 n.110 (questioning the argument that the 
imposition of criminal punishment is a “morally dubious exercise of state power” though 
acknowledging that moral questions would arise if the legal system were “inherently unjust”) 
with Simon, supra note 44, at 1722-28 (noting that there is a compelling argument that lawyers 
ought to subvert “substantive legal norms” in order to avoid excessive and discriminatory 
punishment). 
 106. See Simon, supra note 44, at 1723, 1725. 
 107. See id:  
[I]n some jurisdictions the punishment practices are an integral part of a system of 
policing that targets minority communities and people of color, especially young men, 
for intensive and often abusive surveillance, designed in part to keep them out of areas 
used by privileged racial and economic groups and in part to reinforce their 
subservience to a local power structure that excludes them. 
 108. See supra note 89. Subin cites Simon throughout his article. 
 109. See Subin, supra note 81, at 146 (“It is fundamental to our system of justice that the 
guilty as well as the innocent client be accorded the right to put the state to its proof and have 
the assistance of counsel in doing so.”). Subin does not want to sound too hostile to criminal 
defense. See Subin, Is This Lie Necessary?, supra note 84, at 701 (remarking that “[s]ome of 
my best friends are defense attorneys.”). 
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1994 by Susan Smith before she admitted that she, not the black man 
she initially accused, drowned her children.110 What if the basis of the 
accusation was race, class, sex, or neighborhood?111 What if Subin 
does not know for a fact whether the accused is innocent or not, 
because the accused has read Subin’s articles (and has wisely 
concluded that it is not in his interest to be completely forthcoming), 
but there are nonetheless reasons to doubt the complainant’s 
accusation?  
Fred Zacharias 
Fred Zacharias, a scholar who often writes on prosecutorial ethics, 
also questions the criminal defense exemption in the critique of 
adversarial advocacy.112 He has for some time expressed ambivalence 
about the criminal defense paradigm, characterizing it as 
“superaggressive,”113 “unusually aggressive,”114 “supremely 
partisan,”115 and involving “extreme partisanship”116 and “aggressive 
partisanship.”117 His membership in the Simon/Subin camp is not 
entirely surprising.  
In his 1996 article, The Civil-Criminal Distinction in Professional 
Responsibility,118 Zacharias joins Simon in disputing the basis for the 
“assumption” that criminal defense is different.119 Zacharias argues 
that criminal penalties are not that different from civil remedies,120 
 
 110. See Rick Bragg, A Killer’s Only Confidant: The Man Who Caught Susan Smith, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 4, 1995, at A10 (noting that if Susan Smith had not confessed, the “manhunt for 
the fictitious young black man she had accused of taking her children in a carjacking would 
have continued”). For a thought-provoking fictional treatment of the Susan Smith case, see 
RICHARD PRICE, FREEDOMLAND (1998). 
 111. See Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 41, at 1724.  
 112. See Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, supra note 31; Zacharias, The Civil-
Criminal Distinction, supra note 31. 
 113. See Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, supra note 31, at 167, 177. Zacharias 
draws a studied contrast between superaggressive criminal lawyers and the more restrained—
and ethical—advocates who consider the effect of their advocacy on others. See id. at 167-71. 
 114. Id. at 171. 
 115. Id. at 167. 
 116. Id. at 169 n.17. 
 117. Id. at 169, 170. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Id. at 166. 
 120. See id. at 172-73. 
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criminal defendants are not much different from civil litigants,121 and 
the resource imbalances are not all that different in criminal than civil 
cases.122 He also challenges whether the constitutional arguments in 
support of the criminal defense paradigm have anything to do with 
legal ethics and declares that, in any event, the Constitution “do[es] 
not mandate superaggressive lawyering.”123  
Zacharias’s contribution to the discussion is a more developed 
argument that criminal prosecutions and criminal clients are 
essentially indistinguishable from civil cases and civil litigants. He 
argues that some civil actions, such as those brought by the 
government, threaten the same sort of overreaching by a “government 
juggernaut” as criminal prosecutions, and are just as stigmatizing.124 
An allegation of racial discrimination or sexual harassment publicly 
brands a civil defendant as a social pariah in much the same way as a 
criminal allegation brands the accused.125 A civil litigant faces loss of 
livelihood, savings, and reputation in much the same way that a 
defendant faces loss of liberty.126 Zacharias denigrates the threat of 
incarceration as the critical difference because, with the exception of 
those arrested for the first time, he believes that many offenders do 
not mind serving a little jail time.127 He goes so far as to assert that 
being arrested or incarcerated is no big deal to most “modern” 
defendants who “may meet incarcerated friends” at the local jail,128 
 
 121. See id. at 173-74. 
 122. See id. at 174-76. 
 123. Id. at 176-77. 
 124. Id. at 172-73; see also Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground 
Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992). 
 125. See Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, supra note 31, at 173. 
 126. See id. at 172-73. 
 127. See id. Zacharias claims that he “do[es] not mean to suggest that a threat of 
incarceration is meaningless to such defendants.” Id. However, he then goes on to do just that: 
[I]t is fair to conclude that jail alone may not be terrifying to a subset of defendants 
who are used to it and come from a community where incarceration is routine. 
Likewise, the effect of incarceration on defendants’ lives may not be as severe for 
those who are unemployed and whose community accepts incarceration as relatively 
routine than for defendants who will lose their livelihoods and face shame in their 
communities. 
Id. at 172 n.32; cf. COLE, supra note 28 (arguing that race and class bias operate in every aspect 
of the criminal justice system); MAUER, supra note 28 (examining the unprecedented explosion 
in the United States’ prison population and its impact on the African American community). 
 
 128. See Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, supra note 31, at 174. 
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thus, equating jail for the underclass129 to Starbucks for the coffee 
klatsch. Zacharias concludes that, at the very least, “the assertion that 
criminal defendants are unique is a vast overgeneralization.”130 
IV. WHY CRIMINAL DEFENSE IS DIFFERENT 
There are two kinds of arguments for why criminal defense is 
different from other types of law practice, and why this difference 
warrants a different ethical standard. The typical argument 
approaches the question from the “outside in,” looking to law and 
politics, the balance of resources, and the stakes of punishment versus 
compensation.131 The most thoughtful arguments also consider the 
balance of bargaining power and the notion of legitimacy, namely the 
public’s natural tendency to side with law enforcement.132 As this 
 
 129. See generally JEFFREY H. REIMAN, . . . AND THE POOR GET PRISON (1996); see also 
HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND ANTIPOVERTY 
POLICY (1995); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND 
THE UNDERCLASS (1992); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN 
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); WILLIAM JULIUS 
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1997); WILLIAM 
JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (1987); THE URBAN UNDERCLASS (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson, eds. 
1991). 
 130. See Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, supra note 31, at 177-78. Zacharias 
sees no difference between criminal and civil litigants: 
[W]e cannot assume anything different about their situations, mental state, or resources 
than about those of their civil counterparts. Absent empirical evidence to the contrary, 
we cannot assume that criminal defendants as a whole are different from civil litigants; 
it is unclear that the majority of criminal defendants are more frightened, or more 
threatened, or less capable of mounting a defense than the majority of individual civil 
litigants. 
Id. 
 131. See, e.g., Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, supra note 33, at 1730-40; see 
also Ellen Yaroshevsky, Balancing Victim’s Rights and Vigorous Advocacy for the Defendant, 
1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 135, 136-38 (distinguishing criminal defense); Jay Sterling Silver, 
Professionalism and the Hidden Assault on the Adversarial Process, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 863, 
886-87 (1994) (arguing for partisanship in criminal defense); Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of 
the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543, 548-50 (identifying the criminal defense 
lawyer as the “archetype of the advocate in the adversary system” and distinguishing civil 
lawyers). At one time Fred Zacharias voiced support for this proposition. See Fred C. Zacharias, 
Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 356-57 (1989) (assuming the difference 
between criminal and civil representation for purposes of analyzing attorney-client 
confidentiality rules). 
 132. See Luban, supra note 33, at 1740-48. 
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position has been well argued by others,133 I will only take a moment 
to outline and endorse it. The other argument is from the “inside out,” 
which focuses on the relationship between the accused and counsel, 
the experience of defense counsel, and the experience of the accused. 
I will spend more time discussing this perspective, as it has not been 
fully developed by others, and offers new support for the zealous 
paradigm. 
A. The Argument from the Outside In 
The principal argument for why criminal defense is different, 
thereby warranting a different and more adversarial approach, is both 
political and legal. There is a longstanding American commitment to 
protecting individual rights and curbing state power, especially the 
power to punish.134 This commitment is embodied in the Bill of 
Rights and is further developed in constitutional criminal 
procedure.135  
Proponents of a strong adversarial ethic in criminal defense often 
note that the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments provide 
rights and protections to the criminally accused that are not provided 
to civil litigants.136 In addition, the government’s burden of proof, the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the presumption 
 
 133. David Luban’s response is close to perfect. See id. 
 134. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 60 (“[W]e believe as a matter 
of political theory and historical experience that if the state is not . . . restrained . . . our political 
and civil liberties are jeopardized.”); see also Monroe H. Freedman, A Proposal for Different 
Ethical Standards for Criminal and Civil Practice, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) 
(noting that the “civil libertarian justification for maintaining the traditional zealous 
representation by criminal defense lawyers does not have the same force in the context of civil 
representation.”). 
 135. See FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 13-14 (“[T]he professional responsibilities of the 
lawyer within [the adversarial] system must be determined, in major part, by the same civil 
libertarian values that are embodied in the Constitution.”). 
 136. See Jay Sterling Silver, supra note 131, at 863 (asserting constitutional basis for the 
criminal defense paradigm); see also FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra 
note 9, at ix (characterizing his position on lawyers’ ethics as “rooted in the Bill of Rights”); 
Monroe H. Freedman, Ethical Ends and Ethical Means, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 55, 56 (1991) 
(“Grounded in the fundamental values of the Bill of Rights, my analysis of lawyers’ ethics 
gives individual dignity a central place”). But see Zacharias, supra note 31, at 178 
(acknowledging but giving little weight to “constitutional and procedural benefits available to 
. . . defendants). 
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of innocence reflect a commitment to checking state power even at 
the cost of freeing the guilty. This commitment has no parallel in 
civil proceedings.137 Some commentators note the accused’s Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination as an especially critical 
distinction.138  
At the same time, the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel has 
been called “‘the most pervasive’ of rights, because it affects the 
client’s ability to assert all other rights.”139 As Professor Deborah 
Rhode notes, effective representation is especially important in the 
criminal context: 
These rights-based justifications of neutral partisanship assume 
special force in criminal cases. Individuals whose lives, liberty, 
and reputation are at risk deserve an advocate without 
competing loyalties to the state. Ensuring effective 
representation serves not only to avoid unjust outcomes but 
also to affirm community values and to express our respect for 
individual rights.140 
The principles embodied in the Constitution do more than check 
state power and protect individual rights, however. They “preserve 
the integrity of society itself . . . [by] keeping sound and wholesome 
the procedure by which society visits its condemnation on an erring 
member.”141  
 
 137. But see Luban, supra note 33, at 1741-42 (hypothesizing that despite, or perhaps 
because of these safeguards, jurors may be biased in favor of the prosecution).  
 138. See Stephen Ellmann, Truth and Consequences, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 895, 905 
(2000). 
 139. FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 13 (citing Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State 
Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1957)). 
 140. RHODE, supra note 31, at 54; see also Luban, supra note 33, at 1758 (“[T]he 
injunction to zealous advocacy is at its most demanding in the criminal defense context, where 
the liberal argument for overprotecting rights against the state gives added heft to the norm.”). 
 141. Lon Fuller, The Adversary System in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 35 (H. Berman ed. 
1961); see also DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE, supra note 27, at 415: 
The zealous defense attorney is the last bastion of liberty—the final barrier between an 
overreaching government and its citizens. The job of the defense attorney is to 
challenge the government; to make those in power justify their conduct in relation to 
the powerless; to articulate and defend the right of those who lack the ability or 
resources to defend themselves. 
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They also affirm the humanity of the accused. As Professor 
Laurence Tribe has stated:  
The presumption of innocence, the rights to counsel and 
confrontation, the privilege against self-incrimination, and a 
variety of other trial rights, matter not only as devices for 
achieving or avoiding certain kinds of trial outcomes, but also 
as affirmations of respect for the accused as a human being—
affirmations that remind him and the public about the sort of 
society we want to become and, indeed, about the sort of 
society we are.142  
Although there is some debate about the relative balance of 
resources and power in criminal versus civil settings, especially when 
civil cases involving the government are included, there is no 
question that in most criminal cases the balance is weighted heavily 
on the government’s side. While civil litigants come from a range of 
class backgrounds, the vast majority of criminal defendants are poor 
and must rely on public defenders and court-appointed counsel.143 
Indigent counsel are, in turn, wholly dependent on a strapped court or 
municipal budget for funding investigators, expert witnesses, and 
other services.144 Simon’s assertion that the state does not use its full 
arsenal of resources on most defendants145 is rebutted by Luban’s 
detailed accounting of overall police and prosecution personnel, as 
well as funding advantages of the state.146 The government has the 
advantage even when facing a wealthy or powerful defendant—that 
 
 142. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 
84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1392 (1971).  
 143. Most criminal defense lawyers are either public defenders or court-appointed counsel. 
See STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, INDIGENT DEFENSE 4 (1996) (reporting that, in 
1992, 81 percent of felony defendants in the nation’s seventy-five largest counties had a public 
defender or court-appointed counsel at trial). In 1991, 76 percent of state prison inmates and 54 
percent of Federal prison inmates had court-appointed lawyers representing them for the 
offenses for which they were serving time. See id. at 3. The percentage of non-white inmates 
with court-appointed counsel is even higher: 79 percent of black state prisoners and 64 percent 
of black federal prisoners were represented by court-appointed counsel in 1991. See id. In 1989, 
78 percent of inmates in local jails had court-appointed counsel. See id.  
 144. See Luban, supra note 33, at 1734-35 and authorities cited therein. 
 145. See Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 41, at 1707-08. 
 146. See Luban, supra note 33, at 1731-36. 
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is, if the government chooses to employ available resources.147  
In terms of power, prosecutors wield both demonstrable 
procedural148 and psychological149 advantages. The outcomes tell it 
all: defendants are rarely acquitted.150  
Surprisingly, even in an era of increasingly harsh criminal 
sentences, commentators like Simon and Zacharias question whether 
punishment is sufficiently distinct from civil penalties to warrant a 
different adversarial ethic.151 For both violent offenders, like my 
client Manny, or the non-violent drug offenders who fill our nation’s 
prisons in record numbers,152 a decades-long prison sentence is not 
unusual. Still, there are those who argue the deeply cynical view that 
prison is not so bad for those communities that have grown 
accustomed to it,153 and that the financial and reputational costs of a 
 
 147. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in 
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1199 (1960) (noting the “inherent inequality of 
litigating position between the expanding state and even the most resourceful individual, much 
less the vast majority of resourceless ones”); DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE, supra note 27, 
at 415 (“Even the rich are relatively powerless . . . when confronting the resources of a 
government prosecutor.”); see also Mike Robinson, Rostenkowski Reflects on His Time in Jail, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 1, 1998, at 5 (quoting former House Ways and Means 
Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, who was convicted of misusing federal funds in 
1996: “‘No matter how powerful you may have been, the government can outgun you in every 
case . . . . Once you are in their sights, they hunt you like a wounded animal.’”).  
 148. Luban notes procedural advantages held by the prosecution that have no analogy in 
civil practice, such as a limited (and, in some jurisdictions, nonexistent) obligation to disclose 
evidence prior to trial, many mechanisms for obtaining discovery themselves, and an enormous 
advantage in appellate and collateral review processes, including the “harmless error” doctrine. 
See Luban, supra note 33, at 1736-40. 
 149. See id. at 1740 (noting that people tend to side with authority and want to believe in 
police and prosecutors). See also NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC 
TECHNIQUES 2-12 – 2-20 (2d ed. 2002) (1983) (finding that, notwithstanding the presumption 
of innocence, most jurors believe that those accused of crime are probably guilty, ought to 
testify if they are not, and bear the burden of proving their innocence). 
 150. See Luban, supra note 33, at 1729 n.1, 1729 n.2 (citing Department of Justice 
statistics revealing a 1 percent rate of felony acquittals in state courts and a 2.8 percent rate of 
acquittals in U.S. District Courts). 
 151. See also Mann, supra note 124, at 1796 (discussing the compensation-punishment 
distinction). 
 152. See MAUER, supra note 28, at 9 (referring to the “wave of building and filling prisons 
virtually unprecedented in human history”); ELLIOTT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICA 3 (1998) (noting that “[o]ver the past twenty-five years, the United States has built 
the largest prison system in the world”). 
 153. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text. 
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civil penalty might be more painful for some.154 
As I discuss below, attempts to characterize the difference 
between punishment and monetary compensation without inquiring 
more deeply into the experience of criminal conviction and 
incarceration fall flat. Even at face value, however, criminal 
punishment involves all of the pain of the harshest civil penalty plus 
more. The difference is most visible when the punishment is prison; 
the imprisoned suffer not only loss of liberty, but some of the worst 
“punishment” of civil litigation: loss of “livelihood, savings . . . [and] 
credit rating.”155 Additionally, the imprisoned may face a loss of 
home, family, standing in the community, and future employment.156 
The argument that most offenders are not incarcerated at all, but are 
“let off” on probation, misunderstands the reality of probation. 
Probation often leads to prison.157 Even when the punishment is the 
mere fact of a criminal conviction, the individual suffers more than 
the diffuse stigma that may occur in some civil litigation. An 
individual may lose the fundamental rights of citizenship: the right to 
vote and the right to sit on a jury.158 
B. The Argument from the Inside Out 
William Simon has disparaged the ethical perspective that sheds 
the most light on why criminal defense is different. He calls it a 
“personal relations” approach to legal ethics, dismissing as 
“extralegal” the underlying values of loyalty, trust, empathy, or 
 
 154. See Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, supra note 31, at 172-73; Simon, The 
Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 41, at 1721-22. 
 155. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, supra note 31, at 172. 
 156. See MAUER, supra note 28, at 185-87. 
 157. See Fox Butterfield, Getting Out/A Special Report: Often, Parole Is One Stop On the 
Way Back to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2000, at 1 (discussing the large number of offenders 
who go from prison to community supervision and then back to prison); see also Adam Gelb, 
Forget the Extremes, Try a Dose of Both, WASH. POST, May 6, 2001, at B3 (noting that with 
little or no drug treatment, drug-addicted offenders routinely violate probation and end up in 
prison); Editorial, Put the Prison Bed Idea to Rest, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 19, 
2001, at A28 (noting that in 1999, “37 percent of prison admissions in Texas were for probation 
revocations, with more than half of those being for technical violations”); Butterfield, supra 
(noting that in 1999, 68 percent of those sent to prison in California were parole violators). 
 158. See MAUER, supra note 28, at 178-87; Somini Sengupta, Felony Costs Voting Rights 
for a Lifetime in 9 States, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2000, at A18 (reporting that 4.2 million 
Americans cannot vote because of felony disenfranchisement laws).  
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friendship.159 Simon says the approach is descriptively inaccurate 
because as the lawyer-client relationship is commercial, not personal, 
as the client pays for the lawyer’s loyalty and empathy.160 The mere 
fact that a client pays for a professional’s services, however, does not 
render the relationship commercial.161 He also does not believe that 
the “personal values” of the lawyer-client relation could ever be more 
fundamental than the “values . . . that the relation threatens.”162 Why 
is it axiomatic that “legal merit” and “justice” are more important 
than the bond between a lawyer and client,163 which Simon’s 
approach not only threatens but disregards altogether? Why are 
institutional or public concerns more important than relational or 
personal ones?164 Simon readily rejects a relational perspective as 
 
 159. See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 19. For examples of this 
approach to legal ethics, see THOMAS SHAFFER & ROBERT COCHRAN, LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 40-56 (1994) (discussing the lawyer as friend); Charles Fried, The 
Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 
(1976) (arguing that when lawyers act as the client’s “friend” they act morally); Curtis, supra 
note 27, at 8 (analogizing the lawyer to a spouse, parent, and friend); Ogletree, supra note 100, 
at 1272 (characterizing his relationship with criminal clients as a “true friendship”); Phyllis 
Goldfarb, A Clinic Runs Through It, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 65 (1994) (describing her friendship 
with a client on death row); see also Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Rules, supra note 31, 
at 186-190 (examining legal ethics from the perspective of the nature of the representation and 
the attorney-client relationship).  
 I do not agree with the conception of the lawyer-client relationship as a “friendship.” In my 
view, this asks both too much and too little of lawyers. See Robert J. Condlin, “What’s Love 
Got to Do With It?”: The Contested Conception of the Lawyer-Client Relationship in Clinical 
Legal Scholarship (unpublished manuscript on file with author). However, the lawyer-client 
relationship is a relationship—sometimes a very intense one. The lawyer-client relationship 
must be at the center of any discussion of legal ethics.  
 160. See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 19. Simon adds that the 
model also does not fit because lawyers often serves large organizations not individuals. Id. 
 161. See generally IRWIN Z. HOFFMAN, RITUAL AND SPONTANEITY IN THE 
PSYCHOANALYTIC PROCESS: A DIALECTICAL-CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW (1998). 
 162. See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 19. 
 163. See John Kaplan, Defending Guilty People, 7 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 223, 241 
(1986) (referring to the “symbolic role of the lawyer as the defendant’s only friend”); see also 
Fried, supra note 159, at 1068-69 (noting that “before there is morality there must be the 
person” and arguing the importance of “recogniz[ing] the concrete individuality of [an]other 
person”). 
 164. Scholars with an interest in feminism and clinical legal education tend to examine this 
question. See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and 
Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a 
Different Voice: Speculations on a Women’s Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 
39 (1985); Smith, Rosie O’Neill Goes to Law School, supra note 12. Additionally, in 
contemporary philosophy—especially virtue ethics—the focus is on the intentions, motivations, 
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“simple and . . . appealing . . . but wrong.”165 Indeed, to Simon an 
examination of lawyering from the inside out, exploring the dynamics 
and dilemmas of practicing lawyers,166 is not legal ethics at all.167 
However, if most lawyering, even criminal lawyering, takes place 
outside of a courtroom,168 it would then make sense to focus more on 
the lawyer-client relationship, and on the experience of the 
participants. Important interests and values are served by the 
relationship, even if the parties may not have had these purposes in 
mind. Some of these interests and values might be just as righteous 
and virtuous169 as those embraced by Simon. After all, our 
humanity—and our morality—is defined not only through our 
relationship to society, but through our relationships with other 
individuals.170  
A relational approach to legal ethics sheds important light on the 
difference in criminal defense and helps explain the need for the 
zealous criminal defense paradigm. There are important aspects of 
the criminal defense relationship that are not found in any other area 
of practice. Included among them is the reluctance to enter into the 
relationship in the first place, the difficulty of establishing a 
 
and character of the actor, not on the rightness or wrongness of the act). See JAMES F. KEENAN, 
S.J., GOODNESS AND RIGHTNESS IN THOMAS AQUINAS’S SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 7 (1992); 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984); James F. Keenan, S.J., Virtue Ethics: 
Making a Case as It comes of Age, 67 THOUGHT 115 (1992); see also William C. Spohn, S.J., 
The Return of Virtue Ethics, 53 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 60, 61 (1992) (“Good character produces 
practical moral judgments based on beliefs, experience, and sensitivity more than . . . rules and 
principles.”). 
 165. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 19. 
 166. See MODEL RULES, supra note 28, Pmbl. ¶ 8 (“Virtually all difficult ethical problems 
arise from conflict between a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the 
lawyer’s own interest in remaining an upright person. . . .”); see also RAND JACK & DANA 
CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF 
WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS (1989) (exploring lawyers’ morality, social roles, and personal 
identity). 
 167. See Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 41, at 1723 (commenting that 
Professor Barbara Babcock’s “social worker’s reason”—an ethical motivation for aggressive 
defense—“seems an odd way to characterize an argument about legal ethics”).  
 168. See RHODE, supra note 31, at 55-56. 
 169. Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical 
Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 885-902 (1996). 
 170. See James Keenan, Proposing Cardinal Virtues, 56 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 709, 723 
(1995). 
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relationship of mutuality and trust, and the extraordinary burden of 
maintaining such a relationship.  
Reluctance to Enter into the Relationship 
The most frequently asked question of criminal lawyers and law 
students contemplating a career in criminal defense, commonly called 
“The Question”,171 is how can you defend those people?172 Professor 
Deborah Rhode recounts her own struggle with The Question when 
she was an intern at the Public Defender Service for the District of 
Columbia.173 Rhode prefaces her account by remarking that her first 
case was “almost my last” because it disturbed her “conscience.”174 
She explains why: 
Two of the office’s juvenile clients had stomped an elderly 
“wino” to death, just for the fun of it. They confessed to my 
supervising attorney and to the arresting officer; indeed, they 
appeared somewhat proud of their accomplishment. However, 
the police committed a number of constitutional and 
procedural violations in obtaining the confession and other 
inculpating evidence. My supervisor was able to get the case 
dismissed on what the public would consider a “technicality.” 
He also was proud of his accomplishment. The clients were 
jubilant and unrepentant. I had no doubt that the office would 
see them again. Nor did I doubt that I was utterly unsuited to 
be a criminal defense lawyer. I wasn’t sure I was ready to be a 
lawyer at all.175 
 
 171. See Babcock, supra note 74, at 177; David Feige, How to Defend Someone You Know 
is Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at 59; LISA J. MCINTYRE, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER: THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE SHADOWS OF REPUTE 142 (1987); see also KUNEN, supra note 73, at 
xi (noting that the question is “not so much a question as a demand for an apology, as though a 
defense attorney needs to justify his work, in a way that a prosecutor doesn’t”). 
 172. See generally KUNEN, supra note 73 (exploring the title question through anecdotes 
about the author’s two and a half years as a public defender in Washington, D.C.). 
 173. See RHODE, supra note 31, at 49. 
 174. Id.; but see Curtis, supra note 27, at 15-16 (“[F]or every lawyer whose conscience 
may be pricked, there is another whose virtue is tickled.”).  
 175. RHODE, supra note 31, at 49. 
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Over time Rhode has come to appreciate her supervisor’s role in 
“providing an essential and ethically defensible safeguard for 
constitutional values,” but she maintains that she was right about not 
becoming a defender herself, and about feeling “morally troubled” by 
the case she worked on and by criminal defense in general.176 To 
Rhode’s credit, she did explore criminal defense for a summer; her 
rejection of criminal defense is based on experience.177 For most law 
students and lawyers, however, the moral repugnance of the work is 
self-evident.178  
No other field of law practice is so fraught. The moral dilemmas 
in civil law practice cannot compete with those in criminal defense. 
This is so notwithstanding Monroe Freedman’s famous quip to law 
students: “When you get into practice you will find clients who will 
lie, steal, and kill other human beings out of sheer greed. If you can’t 
handle it you have no business going into the practice of corporate 
law.”179  
The reality is that most criminal defendants are guilty of 
something, if not the precise charges they face.180 As a former public 
defender put it: “One of the awkward truths about being a public 
defender is that you are in the practice of representing people who 
are, indeed guilty.”181 Representing the guilty, especially murderers, 
 
 176. Id. As a criminal defense lawyer for nearly twenty years, I can say that Rhode’s 
experience was atypical. Most serious offenders are not “jubilant” and “unrepentant.” Id. 
Although the causes of crime are complex, see generally ELLIOT CURRIE, CONFRONTING 
CRIME: AN AMERICAN CHALLENGE (1985), most commit crime out of misfortune, not malice. 
 177. For an article by a student who concluded that he could not be a criminal defense 
lawyer after a year in Harvard’s criminal defense clinic, see Robert Rader, Confessions of Guilt: 
A Clinic Student’s Reflections on Representing Indigent Criminal Defendants, 1 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 299 (1994). For a response to Rader by his clinical teacher, see Abbe Smith, Carrying On 
in Criminal Court: When Criminal Defense is Not So Sexy and Other Grievances, 1 CLINICAL 
L. REV. 723 (1995) [hereinafter Smith, Carrying On in Criminal Court]. 
 178. See Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, supra note 80, at 
355-62 (discussing the assumption by lawyers, law students, and the general public that 
criminal defense is amoral or immoral while prosecution is morally unassailable). 
 179. I have heard Monroe Freedman offer this “advice” many times before many 
audiences. It never fails to get a laugh—and make a point. Cf. Abe Fortas, Thurman Arnold and 
the Theater of the Law, 79 YALE L.J. 988, 1002 (1970) (noting that “[r]apists, murderers, child 
abusers, General Motors, Dow Chemical—and even cigarette manufacturers and stream 
polluters—are entitled to a lawyer.”). 
 180. See Silver, supra note 31, at 380; Babcock, supra note 74, at 180.  
 181. Bellows, supra note 40, at 74; see also DERSHOWITZ, supra note 27, at xxi (stating 
that the first rule of the “Rules of the Justice Game” is: “Almost all criminal defendants are, in 
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rapists, child molesters, and other violent street criminals, seems a 
difficult undertaking for many.182 Lawyers and law students 
contemplating criminal defense question whether they would feel 
comfortable helping dangerous criminals go free, whether they could 
employ the requisite methods of zealous defense, and whether 
someone with their talents and ambitions should engage in such 
work.183 
Many commentators shrug and say that criminal defense is not for 
everyone.184 Others continue to try to persuade, cajole, and market 
criminal defense to make it more appealing to those who would look 
elsewhere for legal work.185 We offer justifications,186 motivations,187 
pep talks,188 and appealing stories.189 We do this partly out of love for 
the work—for the challenge, the fun, and the sense of satisfaction—
 
fact, guilty.”). 
 182. See Babcock, supra note 74, at 177; but see MCINTYRE, supra note 171, at 161-62 
(noting that many defenders prefer their clients to be guilty). There is an even greater challenge 
when it comes to representing the most hated pariahs. See Peter Applebome, The Pariah as 
Client: Bombing Case Rekindles Debate for Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1995, at A28 
(quoting Allen Smallwood, a Tulsa, Oklahoma defense lawyer, after Timothy McVeigh’s arrest 
in connection with the Oklahoma City bombing: “‘I’ve said to many people, the acid test of a 
criminal defense lawyer is could you represent Hitler or Adolph Eichmann? . . . . But the 
publicity and the downside to my life personally would be far, far greater in representing 
McVeigh than Hitler.’”). 
 183. See Babcock, supra note 74, at 177. 
 184. See id. at 175-76; see also Mary Halloran, An Ode to Criminal Lawyers, CALIFORNIA 
LAWYER, June 1998, at 96. 
 185. See Abbe Smith, For Tom Joad and Tom Robinson: The Moral Obligation to Defend 
the Poor, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 869; see also Smith, Carrying On in Criminal Court, supra 
note 177, at 735 (admitting the desire to “recruit” students to become indigent criminal defense 
lawyers). 
 186. See Babcock, supra note 74; Kaplan, supra note 163; Roger C. Cramton, Why Defend 
the Guilty?, 11 CORNELL L. FORUM 2 (1984). 
 187. See Ogletree, supra note 100, at 1667-77; see also Feige, supra note 171, at 60: 
[O]ut in the world, in public, we lie all the time. We offer abstract answers full of half-
truths. I do this too. I do it because the truth is too hard to explain. I say that I choose 
sides based on politics and ideology. I believe in the Constitution, and I think in terms 
of proof, not guilt. I tell them that trial work is fun. . . . Ultimately the thing I have so 
much trouble explaining to people is that when I get to know them, I just really, really 
like my clients. 
 188. See Smith, supra note 177, at 746-47. 
 189. See generally KUNEN, supra note 73; see also Babcock, supra note 74, at 179 
(recounting her representation of a drug-addicted woman facing a life sentence for the 
possession of heroin); Smith, Defending the Innocent, supra note 100 (recounting her 
representation of a factually innocent woman). 
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and partly because we worry that no one will become defenders 
otherwise.190 
The ethic of zeal is especially important here because it is 
comfortingly simple.191 How else might would-be defenders be 
assured that they will be able to do the work and sleep at night,192 and 
even feel good about it?193 The paradigm of devotion and zeal serves 
as both the motivation for doing the work and the excuse for doing it 
well: 
Just imagine what would happen if lawyers were to refuse, for 
instance, to represent persons whom they thought to be guilty. 
In a case where the guilt of a person seemed clear, it might turn 
out that some individuals would be deprived completely of the 
opportunity to have the system determine whether or not they 
are in fact guilty. The private judgment of individual lawyers 
would in effect be substituted for the public, institutional 
judgment of the judge and jury. The amorality of lawyers helps 
to guarantee that every criminal defendant will have his or her 
day in court. . . . 
 [T]he adversary system only works if each party to the 
controversy has a lawyer, a person whose institutional role it is  
 
 190. The fear is not only that no one will become a defender, but that there are few people 
fit to practice criminal law. See generally Bright, supra note 40; see also Michael E. Tigar, 
Defending, 74 TEX. L. REV. 101, 104 (1995) (“The most despised, the most endangered 
defendants may be without counsel. Yet their cases . . . are the ones most likely to have excited 
governmental passion in ways that make judgment fallible.”). 
 191. See Wasserstrom, supra note 25, at 9: 
[T]he moral world of the lawyer is a simpler, less complicated, and less ambiguous 
world . . . . There is . . . something . . . seductive about being able to turn aside so 
many ostensibly difficult moral dilemmas and decisions with the reply: but that is not 
my concern; my job as a lawyer is not to judge the rights and wrong of the client or the 
cause; it is to defend as best I can my client’s interests. 
 192. See MCINTYRE, supra note 171, at 139-71 (examining how defense attorneys live with 
themselves when they help the guilty escape punishment). 
 193. See Wasserstrom, supra note 25, at 9; see also Feige, supra note 171, at 59: 
[D]efending the reviled, even those who are guilty, is not some mental trick, nor even 
a moral struggle for me. I don’t lack imagination or willfully close my eyes to 
another’s suffering. Rather, the reality of my clients—their suffering, their fear—is 
more vivid to me than that of the victims. My clients . . . are the ones who desperately 
need my protection. Everyone else can look out for the victims. And they do . . . . 
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to argue, plead and present the merits of his or her case and the 
demerits of the opponent’s.194 
Because of the ethic of zeal, would-be defenders do not have to 
worry about the morality of undertaking the work, or about the day-
to-day strategies employed on behalf of the accused. The defender is 
playing a critical role in a system that depends on adversarial zeal in 
order to function properly. He or she acts morally by embracing the 
ethic of zeal and devotion.  
Difficulty Establishing a Relationship of Trust 
Once a lawyer has undertaken to represent an accused, it is often 
difficult to establish a relationship of trust and confidence.195 This can 
also be a problem for non-criminal lawyers, especially court-
appointed or otherwise “free” lawyers.196 Clients who are unable to 
choose because they cannot pay for their own lawyer are more likely 
to be unsophisticated about the law,197 to feel more alienated in a 
legal setting,198 and to believe that their lawyer is not really working 
for them.199 When a poor person has been accused, arrested, and 
detained, and then given a lawyer by the very system that has taken 
his liberty, the client is all the more wary.200 
 
 194. Wasserstrom, supra note 25, at 10. 
 195. See Silver, supra note 31, at 364 (“In the eyes of many defendants, their attorney is 
the most despicable member of the cast of characters who have conspired to deprive them of 
their liberty; of all the figures in the courtroom, only defense counsel pretends to be on their 
side.”) (emphasis added). 
 196. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the commitment and expertise of lawyers who 
regularly accept judicial appointments or are employed by legal services or public interest law 
offices, or agree to take a client pro bono, many clients persist in believing that you “get what 
you pay for.” See 9 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES 108 (5th ed. 1988); 
MCINTYRE, supra note 171, at 65. 
 197. See Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, supra note 31, at 192. The exception is 
the repeat offenders who have spent substantial time in prison, have educated themselves about 
the law, and have developed into “jail-house lawyers.” These are a small minority of indigent 
defendants.  
 198. See id. 
 199. See MCINTYRE, supra note 171, at 62; Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer 
When You Went to Court? No I had a Public Defender, 1 YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION 4 
(Spring 1971). 
 
 200. See AMSTERDAM, supra note 196, at 108 (“As far as the client is concerned, the 
lawyer is “the law,” along with the police and the judge. . . . S/he will distrust the lawyer even 
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There is a considerable body of literature devoted to client 
counseling.201 This literature offers strategies and techniques for 
overcoming resistance by distrustful or hostile clients,202 such as 
establishing a bond with clients who are “different” from their 
lawyers,203 establishing a bond with clients who are not so different 
from their lawyers,204 and building a relationship of trust, confidence, 
and respect.205 The assertion of the criminal defense paradigm, or its 
civil law variant, is among the most important techniques for 
effective client representation.206 
 
more if the client is indigent and the lawyer is court-appointed.”). See also Silver, supra note 
31, at 364 n.91, quoting CHARLES SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 305 
(1978): 
For the bulk of defendants—represented by Public Defenders—their attorney is at best 
a middleman and at worst an enemy agent. Not only is the process of criminal justice 
. . . an assembly line dedicated to turning over cases . . . but the defendant’s own 
attorney is . . . a production worker on the line. He is not “their” representative, but in 
league with those who would determine the defendants’ fates. 
 201. See, e.g., ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, 
COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION (1990); BINDER ET 
AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 22; BINDER & PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND 
COUNSELING, supra note 22; MARK K. SCHOENFIELD & BARBARA PEARLMAN SCHOENFIELD, 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1981); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & 
JAMES R. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1987) 
(1997); Ellmann, supra note 22. 
 202. See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 22, at 32-45, 239-56; 
Ellmann, supra note 22, at 721-32; see also AMSTERDAM, supra note 196, at 106-10 
(suggesting techniques for putting a criminal client at ease). 
 203. See AMSTERDAM, supra note 196, at 108; Smith, Rosie O’Neill Goes to Law School, 
supra note 12, at 15-27; see also Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE. 
L.J. 1049, 1052 (1970) (“[P]oor people are not always delighted with their lawyers. . . . [T]here 
are important problems of style, differences in income and education, frustration and anger 
about failure, and a host of social, cultural and psychological differences that tend to divide 
rather than unite poor people and their lawyers.”).  
 204. See Ogletree, supra note 100, at 1271-75 (discussing “empathy” as a motivation for 
public defenders and a technique for connecting with clients). 
 205. See AMSTERDAM, supra note 196, at 105:  
The initial interview in a criminal case is probably the most important single exchange 
that counsel will have with the client. It largely shapes the client’s judgment of the 
lawyer. This first judgment may be indelible. At the least, it gravely influences all 
future dealings of the two. The lawyer’s primary objective in the initial interview, 
therefore, is the establishment of an attorney-client relationship grounded on mutual 
confidence, trust, and respect. 
 
 206. See AMSTERDAM, supra note 196, at 107 (“The essential impression to convey is that 
counsel views his or her own job as being exclusively to serve and help the client to the best of 
counsel’s abilities.”); see also KUNEN, supra note 73, at 44: 
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The mere assertion of the paradigm or the principles underlying it, 
however, does not ensure a trusting, productive lawyer-client 
relationship.207 The lawyer will have to earn the client’s trust through 
zealous, devoted, client-centered conduct,208 and may have to do so 
over and over again, continually proving herself.  
Still, the struggle to obtain, and hold on to a client’s trust can be 
stressful and tiresome. A recent study of occupational stress among 
public defenders found that difficult or “abusive” clients are the 
number one cause of stress.209 As one experienced defender put it, “‘I 
do like my job, [but] what I don’t like about it is the difficulty of the 
clientele. . . . [They] make the job difficult.’”210 Indigent criminal 
clients are often “unhappy.”211 They may worry about their lawyer’s 
competence,212 be suspicious of their lawyer’s loyalty,213 and may 
 
“Wyatt, my name’s Jim Kunen. I’m a lawyer with the Public Defender Service. Here’s 
one of my cards.” I pushed it through the inch-high slot at the base of the screen. 
“You’re charged with armed robbery. I’ll be your lawyer, if you want one. You want a 
lawyer?” 
 “Yeah.” 
 No one ever said no. When you’re locked inside, you can’t help yourself. Somebody 
on the outside might help you. Can’t hurt. 
 “Good. Okay. Now, as your lawyer, I work for you. You’re the boss. Whatever you 
want, that’s what I’ll try to get. Like, you want to stay in jail, I’ll try to help you stay in 
jail. You want to get out, I’ll try to get you out. What do you want, in or out?” 
 “I want to get out,” Wyatt said patiently.  
 207. See Ellmann, supra note 138, at 916. 
 208. Compare BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 22, at 241 (advising 
lawyers to offer a strong statement about confidentiality to assure the client of the lawyer’s 
trustworthiness) with AMSTERDAM, supra note 196, at 108 (“Counsel will seldom find that it is 
possible to overcome [client distrust] . . . merely by promising the client that counsel intends to 
work assiduously in the client’s behalf; rather, counsel must actually do something for the 
client.”). 
 209. See David R. Lynch, In Their Own Words: Occupational Stress Among Public 
Defenders, 34 CRIM. L. BULL. 473, 476-79. 
 210. Id. at 476. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See id. at 477 (noting that public defenders are often believed to be less able than 
private lawyers); id. at 478 (quoting a South Carolina public defender: “‘[A]s it is now, a lot of 
them out there don’t even think public defenders are lawyers.’”). 
 213. See id. at 477-78 (reporting that clients accused the defenders of being in league with 
the prosecution and of getting a “kickback” for convictions); see also Silver, supra note 31, at 
364 n.91, quoting CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE at 305 
(1978) (“[D]efendants . . . tended to see their [court-appointed] lawyer as representing the legal 
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never get enough time and attention from their lawyer.214 There is a 
tendency on the part of clients to blame their lawyers for whatever 
results from their case.215 It is not an easy relationship.216 
It is remarkable that public defenders are able to establish 
effective lawyer-client relationships, notwithstanding widespread 
misgivings about both their abilities and institutional role.217 Yet, 
they manage to do so with all kinds of clients: the guilty and 
innocent, the sophisticated and naive, the hardened and vulnerable.218 
Without a strong defense ethic, defenders could not establish a 
lawyer-client relationship built on trust and confidence, or, frankly, 
any relationship at all. Criminal defense lawyers, more than any other 
type of practitioners, must be able to assure clients: “I’m your lawyer. 
I don’t give a [expletive deleted] about anyone else.”219 
 
system to them, rather than representing them to the system.”). One public defender puts it 
plainly: 
[Indigent criminal clients] do not know me from beans; they do not trust anyone who 
works in the court system; I am white and they are usually black; they are not paying 
me a dime and since when does that get you anything; even worse, they know that the 
people who are paying me are the same people, more or less, who pay the cops and the 
D.A.’s. 
Bellows, supra note 40, at 88.  
 214. See Lynch, supra note 209, at 478 (quoting a South Carolina public defender: 
“‘Usually the first thing I hear when I finally have time to talk to a client is, “you never return 
my phone calls . . . . You never talk to me, I don’t think I’m getting good representation.”’”). 
 215. See id. at 477 (quoting a New York public defender: “‘Let’s see. I’ve been blamed for 
people losing their babies. I’ve been blamed for families breaking up. I’ve been blamed for 
people in jail, for people losing their liberties . . . .’”). 
 216. But see id. at 490 (quoting a South Carolina public defender: “‘I’ve tried sixty death 
penalty cases . . . . Every person is a human being. You learn to like them.’”); MCINTYRE, THE 
PUBLIC DEFENDER, supra note 171, at 168 (reporting that most public defenders said that they 
end up liking their clients); Lynch, supra note 209 (quoting a public defender: “‘A lot of 
criminals I have gotten to like. There are some real nice human beings even if they are in real 
serious trouble.’”). 
 217. See MCINTYRE, supra note 171, at 89 (reporting that most clients believe that public 
defenders are not “real lawyers”). 
 218. See generally KUNEN, supra note 73. 
 219. CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Home Box Office 1990) (legal aid lawyer counseling indigent 
criminal client and trying to get client to trust him). 
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Extraordinary Burden of Maintaining the Relationship 
Even commentators who would temper criminal defense advocacy 
acknowledge that there is something uniquely burdensome about 
representing the criminally accused.220 Indeed, there is an entire body 
of literature devoted to the burdens—and blessings—of criminal 
defense.221 
As Professor Barbara Babcock has noted, the confessional 
literature by defense lawyers is filled with great triumphs as well as 
deep isolation.222 The triumphs are a source of pride and vindication; 
they are the payoff for otherwise unremitting professional 
isolation.223 Defenders are isolated from a public that misapprehends 
 
 220. See Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, supra note 42, at 2269 (“No one 
would quarrel with [the] observation that ‘there is something exceptionally burdensome about 
lawyering on behalf of the accused.’”) (internal citations omitted); see also Simon, Mrs. Jones’s 
Case, supra note 89 (acknowledging the special burden of criminal representation that exists in 
even a minor case). In Mrs. Jones’s Case, Simon recounts his one criminal defense experience, 
representing the housekeeper of a partner in his law firm who was accused of leaving the scene 
of an accident. Although there is a degree of hubris in Simon writing about criminal 
representation when he has handled only one such case, it is nonetheless a thoughtful piece, and 
one that is especially useful to law students and new lawyers. For a critical reply to Simon, see 
Mark Spiegel, The Case of Mrs. Jones Revisited: Paternalism and Autonomy in Lawyer-Client 
Counseling, 1997 BYU L. REV. 307. 
 221. See, e.g., LESLIE ABRAMSON, THE DEFENSE IS READY: LIFE IN THE TRENCHES OF 
CRIMINAL LAW (1997); G. GETTY & J. PRESLEY, PUBLIC DEFENDER (1974); PAUL HOFFMAN, 
WHAT THE HELL IS JUSTICE: THE LIFE AND TRIALS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER 22 (1974); 
KUNEN, supra note 73; SEYMOUR WISHMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER (1981); 
IRVING STONE, CLARENCE DARROW FOR THE DEFENSE (1941); Randy Bellows, Notes of a 
Public Defender, in PHILIP B. HEYMANN & LANCE LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
OF LAWYERS; CASE STUDIES 69-101 (1988); James Mills, I Have Nothing To Do With Justice, 
LIFE, Mar. 12, 1971, at 65; see also DERSHOWITZ, supra note 27, at 289-318 (recounting the 
representation of Ricky and Raymond Tison, who were sentenced to death for helping their 
father escape from prison); Babcock, supra note 74, at 180-81 (noting the psychological toll of 
criminal defense); Phyllis L. Crocker, Feminism and Defending Men on Death Row, 29 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 981 (1998) (discussing the dilemmas in being a feminist and defending men 
convicted of rape and murder); Ogletree, supra note 100, at 1239-42 (discussing the 
phenomenon of public defender “burnout”); Smith, Defending the Innocent, supra note 100 
(discussing the extraordinary burden of defending the innocent). 
 222. See Babcock, supra note 74, at 180. 
 223. See ABRAMSON, supra note 221, at 134-43 (a defense lawyer commenting on 
prevailing in a righteous case: “Sometimes, this job is worth all the angst.”). However, a 
defender’s satisfaction in a victory or a job well done must largely come from within. See 
Babcock, supra note 74, at 181 (“The admiration [the defender] receives, if he succeeds, is 
bestowed grudgingly.”); see also DERSHOWITZ, supra note 27, at 417: 
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their work, from mistrustful clients who tend to be very different 
from their lawyers in class, race, culture, and language, and even 
from the bar.224 The isolation from other lawyers is caused by the 
uniquely precarious moral position that defenders occupy in fulfilling 
their professional obligations to clients and to the system: “They 
alone go through life being asked constantly to explain their 
professional existence.”225  
Some defenders don’t mind explaining themselves and do so with 
a kind of rebellious pride, if not bravado: 
I could, if I wanted to, represent only defendants who I believe 
are innocent or decent. I deliberately do not do that. I select my 
cases without regard to whether the defendant is guilty or what 
I think of him personally. Nor do I consider the likelihood of 
winning. . . . I regard the representation of a guilty and 
despicable defendant, with little prospect of winning, as a 
challenge—and, indeed as one of the highest obligations of my 
profession. 
 I try to pick the most challenging, the most difficult, and the 
most precedent-setting cases.226 
Others are more ambivalent about the constant demand to explain 
and justify their work in criminal defense. Defense lawyer Michael 
Tigar, for example, initially dismisses the suggestion that he ought to 
respond to the criticism of his representation of one of the accused in 
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing:  
 
Attorneys who defend the guilty and the despised will never have a secure or 
comfortable place in any society. Their motives will be misunderstood; they will be 
suspected of placing loyalty to clients above loyalty to society; and they will be 
associated in the public mind with the misdeeds of their clients . . . . 
There will never be a Nobel Prize for defense attorneys who succeed in freeing the guilty. 
Indeed, there are few prizes or honors ever bestowed on defense lawyers for their zealous 
advocacy. 
 224. See Babcock, supra note 74, at 181. 
 225. Id. at 180-81. Alan Dershowitz agrees that there is something wrong with this. See 
DERSHOWITZ, supra note 27, at 416 (“One of the truest tests of a free country is how it treats 
those whose job it is to defend the guilty and the despised. . . . One of the surest ways of 
undercutting the independence of defense attorneys is to question the propriety of their 
representing the guilty.”). 
 226. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 27, at xv. 
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 The editors . . . . hinted vaguely that I might want to answer 
criticism of my representing Terry Lynn Nichols. I am not 
responding to those hints, because I do not need to, at least not 
in a publication by and for lawyers. I was appointed by the 
court . . . . The man who ably keeps my boots repaired told me 
last week that he well understood what I was doing. “If people 
who get arrested did not have lawyers, then anybody the police 
suspect would be railroaded off to jail. It would be a police 
state.”227 
If a shoe repairman can understand the importance of defending 
an unpopular client, says Tigar, surely law students and lawyers can 
understand it as well.228 Still, Tigar proceeds to offer an eloquent 
apologia for criminal defense, indeed, a love letter: “To accept a great 
challenge requires, at least for me, a passionate commitment to fulfill 
it. In litigation as in love, technical proficiency without passion is not 
wholly satisfying.”229  
Then there is the burden of the work itself: the burden of standing 
between the accused and the state, of standing beside a person in 
need. Although many defenders regard their work as an honor, it is 
no small undertaking to “see [that justice is] done for a fellow 
creature whose life [they are] to shelter.”230 It is often draining, 
 
 227. Tigar, supra note 190, at 101. 
 228. Indeed, Tigar says that any attempt to justify himself would be “an arrogant, foolish, 
pointless act.” Id. at 110. 
 229. Id. at 102. There is anger as well. See id. at 103 (“I am dismayed and angered by what 
I see around me, and I think that as a lawyer the only way through the present terrible time is to 
fashion and refashion a certain image of justice.”). Tigar’s notion of justice is very different 
from William Simon’s, and has a decidedly defense perspective: 
The past—the suffering and tragedy—are established events, to be understood as well 
as one can. Stepping into the moment now is a search for something called justice. 
Justice or injustice, in the now and in the future, is part of a process. The past events 
cannot be unraveled or undone, but one can perhaps prevent people’s attitudes towards 
those events from becoming an excuse for injustice. 
 I am talking of a prosaic, down-to-earth notion of justice. Something like Camus 
was describing when he said that our chance of salvation is to strive for justice. . . . 
Justice, as Camus also reminded us, must be more than an abstract idea; it must be a 
reflection of compassion for one’s fellow beings. 
Tigar, supra note 190, at 103-04. 
 230. Tigar, supra note 190, at 110; 
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exhausting, and heart-breaking.231 Of course, it can also be fun, 
interesting, and gratifying,232 but, there is no way around the burden.  
Defense lawyer Seymour Wishman shares a nightmarish “moment 
of reckoning.” Often, at least in big city practice, defenders have a 
level of anonymity; they generally do not run into former clients, 
witnesses, or jurors. Still, Wishman tells of encountering a rape 
complainant in a hospital that he had once cross-examined. At trial, 
Wishman succeeded in convincing a jury that the complainant had 
invited several men to have sex with her, contrary to her accusation 
of being a victim of gang rape. Upon seeing Wishman, the woman 
became so enraged, that she had to be restrained.233 
The incident caused Wishman to reflect on his life as a criminal 
defense lawyer:  
Since starting out, I had represented hundreds of people 
accused of crimes, and not only had most of them been 
guilty—many of them had been guilty of atrocities. 
 Hundreds, I had represented hundreds—trying to keep them 
out of jail, keep them out on the street. I could no longer 
deflect the realization—this chilling glimpse of myself—that I 
had used all my skill and energy on behalf of a collection of 
criminals. Not all of them, but many, had been monsters—
nothing less—who had done monstrous things. Sure, some of 
them might have been guilty of crimes made inevitable by 
poverty, but their victims hadn’t caused their poverty, and 
most of the victims were equally poor. Furthermore, many 
people from backgrounds similar to my clients’ didn’t go out 
and mug or rape or kill.234 
Though Wishman had apparently reached a breaking point long 
before running into the complainant,235 his story is not unlike how 
many defenders feel, especially when they handle serious cases. In 
 
 231. See generally Smith, Defending the Innocent, supra note 100. 
 232. See ABRAMSON, supra note 221, at 163; Babcock, supra note 74, at 178; Feige, supra 
note 171, at 59. 
 233. See WISHMAN, supra note 221, at 3-6. 
 234. Id. at 16. 
 
 235. See WISHMAN, supra note 221, at 18 (admitting that his severe reaction to the woman 
in the hospital came at a time when he had begun to have reservations about criminal defense). 
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homicide and other violent felony cases, the stakes are increasingly 
high for the accused,236 as well as for the alleged victim.237 
Representing “people who do terrible things”238 takes its toll on a 
lawyer in a way that other law practice simply does not.239  
There is no question that the burden on criminal defenders is 
real.240 In addition to dealing with difficult clients and grappling with 
personal-professional conflict,241 there are a host of other burdens, 
including: unwieldy caseloads;242 the judicial practice of punishing 
defendants who exercise their right to go to trial;243 the necessity of 
dealing with unreasonable, self-righteous prosecutors;244 the 
unpredictability of whether a case will go to trial;245 and the 
enormous responsibility of “saving clients.”246 
 
 236. See Lynch, supra note 209, at 483 (describing a trial for a sixty-one-year-old man who 
faced a minimum of 15 years in prison if convicted—a virtual death sentence for the client); id. 
at 489-90 (noting the enormous stress of representing defendants in death penalty cases). 
 237. See WISHMAN, supra note 221, at 17 (referring to the “unjustified disgrace” in court of 
a woman who might well have been raped and sodomized). 
 238. See Smith, Defending Defending, supra note 25, at 928 n.19. 
 239. WISHMAN, supra note 221, at 16 (noting other kinds of law practice that were “less 
anxiety-ridden, more profitable, and more prestigious than criminal law”). 
 There are other nightmares for criminal defenders worse than the one Wishman shares. See 
MCINTYRE, supra note 171, at 168-69 (public defender recounting the “‘defense lawyer’s 
nightmare’”—of making a “brilliant” argument that led to the dismissal of a murder indictment 
only to have the client later kill three other people); Cookie Ridolfi, Statement on Representing 
Rape Defendants in LEGAL ETHICS, 279-80 (Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, eds., 3d ed. 
2001) (defense lawyer discussing her discomfort defending rape cases after obtaining an 
acquittal for a client who raped again).  
 240. See generally Lynch, supra note 209; see also JACK & JACK, supra note 166, at 72-78 
(discussing the criminal lawyer’s obligation to protect the client’s rights even though doing so 
might conflict with the needs of the community and the client’s own conscience). 
 241. See Smith, Rosie O’Neill Goes to Law School, supra note 12, at 51-60. Lynch refers to 
this as “role conflict.” Lynch, supra note 209, at 475. 
 242. See RHODE, supra note 31, at 61 (noting that caseloads can be as high as 3500 
misdemeanors and 900 felonies annually); Lynch, supra note 209, at 479-81; see also Chester 
L. Mirsky, Quality Legal Aid: Going, Going, Gone, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 4, 1995, at A19; Rodney 
J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer: Zealous Advocate, Double Agent, or Beleaguered 
Dealer? 28 CRIM. L. BULL. 419, (1992). 
 243. See Lynch, supra note 209, at 482-84. 
 244. See id. at 484-85; see also Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor, 
supra note 80, at 378-79. 
 245. See Lynch, supra note 209, at 486-87. 
 246. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 27, at 318; see also Lynch, supra note 209, at 489 
(quoting a North Carolina public defender: “‘I remember the first time I waited for a jury to 
come back and my blood pressure was literally so high I could see the blood coursing through 
my little capillaries.”). 
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One can only imagine what criminal representation would look 
like if there were no ethical requirement of zealous criminal defense. 
Disincentives to effective representation of the criminally accused 
already prevail: institutional pressure on both the public and private 
defense bar to turn over high volumes of clients at the lowest cost; 
low hourly payment rates, flat fees, and ceilings on compensation for 
court-appointed attorneys; lack of investigative and other resources; 
pressure on defenders by judges and prosecutors to avoid 
“obstructing” justice; and ineffectual judicial and professional checks 
on inadequate representation.247 Neither market forces nor regulatory 
systems effectively counteract these disincentives, particularly as the 
livelihood of court-appointed lawyers and public defenders is not 
dependent on the satisfaction of clients, and judges often prefer 
lawyers not known for zealous defense advocacy to their more 
demanding alternative.248 
It is simply harder to take on the professional responsibilities of 
criminal defense than other kinds of law practice.249 The stakes are 
higher, the responsibilities are greater, the consequences are broader, 
and public support is nonexistent. This is why my friend, a civil 
poverty attorney, acknowledged that her own prior misjudgment in a 
case, no matter how much suffering it caused her or her client, was 
different from my own.  
When I say the system is weighted against the accused, I am 
referring not only to the inequality of resources, information, and 
 
 247. See RHODE, supra note 31, at 61-64. 
 248. See id. at 62; see also Berlow, supra note 36, at 28 (depicting Johnny B. Mostiler, the 
only public defender in Spalding County, Georgia, “the archetype of what many public 
defenders refer to as ‘meet ‘em, greet ‘em, and plead ‘em’ lawyers”). Berlow describes a case in 
which Mostiler represented a fifteen-year-old girl who had shot her great aunt during an 
argument a year before. Her guilty plea and sentencing—resulting in a sentence of life in 
prison—took ten minutes. Mostiler assembled no family members or friends as a show of 
support, presented no mitigating evidence, and raised no challenge to his client being tried as an 
adult. Id. Another former client complained that the first time he spoke with Mostiler was the 
day before his murder trial. The client maintains his innocence and has filed an appeal alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. 
 249. For one of the most wrenching dilemmas in criminal defense, see generally Anne 
Hull, A Living Hell or a Life Saved?; Capitol Shooter’s Untreated Madness Fuels Legal and 
Ethical Debate, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2001, at A1 (discussing the strategy of federal public 
defenders to resist psychiatric treatment for their severely mentally ill client who faces the death 
penalty for shooting two U.S. Capitol Police officers in July, 1998).  
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power, but to the intentional design of indigent criminal defense to 
process the maximum number of defendants at the lowest cost.250 This 
is not simply the jaded view of a life-long criminal defender. Richard 
Posner, the presiding judge of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit, and a prominent legal scholar, applauds the 
intentional maintenance of an inadequate system of indigent criminal 
defense: 
I can confirm from my own experience as a judge that criminal 
defendants are generally poorly represented. But if we are to 
be hardheaded we must recognize that this may not be an 
entirely bad thing. The lawyers who represent indigent 
criminal defendants seem to be good enough to reduce the 
probability of convicting an innocent person to a very low 
level. If they were much better, either many guilty people 
would be acquitted or society would have to devote much 
greater resources to the prosecution of criminal cases. A bare-
bones system for defense of indigent criminal defendants may 
be optimal.251 
At first glance, Posner’s observation is stunning; it is also 
remarkably candid. Still, Posner’s view that a bare-bones indigent 
criminal defense system serves the greater social good by ensuring 
that it is not too difficult for the government to obtain convictions is 
hardly surprising, at least not to those who are familiar with the 
quality of criminal justice for the poor.252 In contrast to Simon’s 
assertion that the public does not adequately fund criminal defense 
 
 250. See Berlow, supra note 36, at 29. Among the payment schemes that favor cost 
containment over quality representation are low-bid fixed price contracts, resulting in one 
attorney handling all of the indigent defense in one Georgia county for an average cost of 
$189.00 a case—and low hourly rates, such as $18.00 in one Montana county. Id. at 30. In 
federal court, fees average $53.00 hour, causing even Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 
hardly a defender of “criminal’s rights,” to complain that the low hourly rate “‘is seriously 
hampering the ability of judges to recruit attorneys to provide effective representation.’” Id. 
 251. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORALS AND LEGAL THEORY 163-64 
(1999). 
 252. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Cheap Justice, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 1998, at WK15 (quoting 
Stephen Bright: “‘If you’re the average poor person you are going to be herded through the 
criminal justice system about like an animal is herded through the stockyards. . . . [O]ur system 
of justice is like the sky box at the stadium, or membership in the country club—available only 
to people who can afford it.’”). 
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because of criminal defense lawyers’ offensive conduct,253 Posner 
sees low-quality representation as beneficial to society. 
Those who challenge the difference in criminal defense are not 
engaged in a mere intellectual exercise. They aim to drastically alter 
the nature of advocacy in a system that is already heavily weighted 
against the accused. Whether in the name of “justice,”254 “truth,”255 or 
“equality,”256 these scholars seek to deprive the accused of lawyers 
passionately committed to their cause. Finding that David’s slingshot 
is too much for a well-intentioned, but weary, Goliath,257 they would 
deprive the accused of defenders with mettle or metal.  
A Comment on the Purported Diminished Significance of Punishment 
Scholars disputing the difference in criminal defense, and the 
difference between compensation and punishment, seldom seriously 
reckon with the client’s experience. Clients who have been in both 
civil and criminal court can tell the difference. Likewise, clients 
currently embroiled in the criminal system, whether incarcerated or 
“free” on bail, but restricted to work, home, and the drug testing 
center, would jump at the chance to be in a noncriminal setting. And 
what about prospective clients? Just ask the random person on the 
street whether he or she would rather be civilly sued or criminally 
prosecuted, and you will have the answer. No one who knows the 
slightest thing about criminal prosecution would choose it over civil 
litigation.258  
 
 253. See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 193. 
 254. See supra notes 44-80 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra notes 81-111 and accompanying text. 
 256. See Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, supra note 42, at 1066 (arguing that defenders 
should be more “race-conscious”); Alfieri, Lynching Ethics, supra note 42, at 1066 (proposing a 
rule which would prohibit lawyers from employing “racialized strategies” in advocacy). 
 257. See Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, supra note 31, at 170 (arguing against 
the idea of a “government juggernaut”); Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 41, 
at 1707 (arguing against the “image of the lonely individual facing Leviathan”). 
 258. For an example that should resonate for lawyers, see JANET MALCOLM, THE CRIME OF 
SHEILA MCGOUGH (1999) (examining the criminal prosecution of a lawyer convicted of 
conspiring with a client to defraud investors). Malcolm tells the story of a naive and 
inexperienced solo practitioner who ended up in prison for not maintaining proper professional 
bounds with a conartist client. There is no question that the lawyer would have preferred to face 
disciplinary proceedings by the local bar rather than a criminal trial. For a biting critique of the 
book—and the author’s belief in the lawyer’s innocence—see Richard A. Posner, In the Fraud 
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It is simply wrong to suggest that for some communities, criminal 
prosecution, which always carries with it the threat of loss of liberty 
or life, is no big deal.259 In nearly two decades of law practice, I have 
seen too many weeping clients contradict this assertion.260 The 
dolorous defendants come in all shapes and sizes. It is not just the 
first-timers who feel dread, fear, sorrow, regret, and self-loathing at 
their predicament. Experienced offenders often understand the horror 
of what they are facing more than the first-timers: the feeling of 
banishment; the shame and anguish of family and friends; the 
dependence on lawyers and others who are bound to fail them; and 
the reality of doing time.261 Some would call my client Manny a 
member of the community that has grown accustomed to 
incarceration. He had been arrested, convicted, and locked up before. 
He knew plenty of others who had been or were currently locked up. 
He had friends who were both perpetrators and victims of drugs and 
guns. But he cared deeply about his loss of freedom and of family: 
his children growing up without him, his wife growing old without 
 
Archives, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 19, 1999, at 29; see also John Diamond & Stephen 
Franklin, Pardon Is Emotional Triumph for Rostenkowski, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 24, 2000, 
at C10 (reporting that former chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, Dan 
Rostenkowski, spent more than $2 million in legal fees and lost his House seat in the course of 
his prosecution for improper use of public funds). 
 259. See Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, supra note 31, at 173 (“[C]ivil litigants 
probably are at just as much risk and under the same cloud of suspicion as criminal 
defendants”); Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 41, at 1721 (acknowledging 
that the argument that punishment is different from compensation has “some substance,” but 
dismissing punishment as a “categorical rationale for aggressive defense”). Indeed, I think the 
argument is obscene. 
 260. For support from a career public defender, see Feige, supra note 171, at 59 (“My 
client . . . is very human and very real. It is his tears I see, his hand I hold and his mother I 
console.”). 
 261. See JOHN EDGAR WIDEMAN, BROTHERS AND KEEPERS 230 (1984): 
You got time but you can’t do nothing wit [sic] it. I mean there’s twenty-four hours to 
a day in here just like out in the world. You ain’t booked up or nothing for most of 
them so you’d think you could take care of business, but ain’t hardly no business gets 
taken care of in the joint. 
 Cause it ain’t really your time. Don’t know how many evenings I sat down to write 
you or write somebody else and there ain’t nothing to say. Can’t write word one. It 
ain’t like I ain’t got time. I be itching to write all day. Writing letters in my mind while 
I’m doing other stuff. Can’t wait to get back to my cell so I can write this hot letter but 
then I’m by myself and I sit down and ain’t nothing to say. Ain’t nothing worth saying 
cause ain’t nothing happening, really . . . .   
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him, and his mother dying without him.262 
The suggestion that prison is no big deal for communities with 
high rates of incarceration is belied not only by the experience of 
defenders,263 but by the experience of the imprisoned themselves. 
Although educated white prisoners tend to have their prison writings 
published more than other prisoners,264 the voices of the more typical 
inmate can still be found.265 Whether depicting the physical or sexual 
violence of prison,266 loneliness,267 lack of privacy and dignity,268 
 
 262. Manny wrote a letter to the judge prior to sentencing. In it, he wrote: 
Your Honor, I am truly sorry for what I have done. I have disappointed my family and 
my kids . . . . This is the longest time I have ever been incarcerated. I hate to say it but 
I needed to come to jail to really see how it feels to be away from my family. Now I 
see it’s no place for me, and while I’m here I am taking the first real steps to changing 
my life for the better . . . . I want to be a positive role model for my kids and my nieces 
and nephew. 
Letter from “Manny”, May, 2000 (on file with author). 
 263. See ABRAMSON, supra note 221; Babcock, supra note 74; Feige, supra note 171. 
 264. See, e.g., SOL WACHTLER, AFTER THE MADNESS: A JUDGE’S OWN PRISON MEMOIR 
(1997); JEAN HARRIS, THEY ALWAYS CALL US LADIES: STORIES FROM PRISON (1988); JEAN 
HARRIS, MARKING TIME: LETTERS FROM JEAN HARRIS TO SHANA ALEXANDER (1991); JEAN 
HARRIS, STRANGER IN TWO WORLDS (1986). For the penetrating perspective of a journalist 
who worked undercover as a prison guard, see TED CONOVER, NEWJACK: GUARDING SING 
SING (2000). 
 265. See, e.g., JACK HENRY ABBOTT, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST: LETTERS FROM PRISON 
(1981) (a prisoner who grew up in penal institutions writing about being a long-term prisoner); 
MUMIA ABU-JAMAL, LIVE FROM DEATH ROW (1995); CLAUDE BROWN, MANCHILD IN THE 
PROMISED LAND (1965); RUBIN HURRICANE CARTER, THE 16TH ROUND: FROM NUMBER 1 
CONTENDER TO NUMBER 45472 (1974) (wrongly convicted death row inmate writes of growing 
up black in America and his years in prison); GEORGE JACKSON, SOLEDAD BROTHER (1970); 
WILBERT RIDEAU & RON WIKBERG, LIFE SENTENCES RAGE AND SURVIVAL BEHIND BARS 
(1992) (prisoners writing about the reality of life behind bars). One prisoner’s experience is 
gracefully depicted by his brother, acclaimed writer John Edgar Wideman. See WIDEMAN, 
supra note 261. The experience of a death row inmate is powerfully portrayed by the nun who 
was his spiritual adviser. See SISTER HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS 
ACCOUNT OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1993).  
 266. See ABBOTT, supra note 265, at 65-86; Wilbert Rideau, The Sexual Jungle, in RIDEAU 
& WIKBERG, supra note 265, at 73-107. 
 267. See WIDEMAN, supra note 261, at 230: 
[I]t got something to do with being lonely. Being so [expletive deleted] up inside you 
never feel like doing nothing. Being lonely’s one the worst things about the joint. 
Probably the worst. Always a lot of fools and crazy people surrounding you so you 
ain’t never alone but you always lonely. Longer I spend in here, the more I back away. 
. . . I got to find my own space. Even if it’s tiny. 
 268. See CARTER, supra note 265, at 162: 
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claustrophobia,269 boredom,270 routine humiliation,271 or the fear of 
 
I needed a shower—bad! Instead, I was given a bucket of scalding hot water, then 
locked into my cell. Thus began my initiation into the weird ritual of “bird bathing.” 
 “Dip and dunk,” they called it. “Dip your towel, and with your soap you dunk, you 
scrub your tail in your own nasty funk.” 
See also ABU-JAMAL, supra note 265, at 10: 
What visitors do not see, prior to the visit, is a horrifying spectacle—the body-cavity 
strip search. Once the prisoner is naked, the visiting-room guard spits out a familiar 
cadence: 
 Open yer mouth. 
 Stick out your tongue. 
 You wear any dentures? 
 Lemme see both sides of your hands. 
 Pull your foreskin back. 
 Lift your sac. 
 Turn around. 
 Bend over. 
 Spread your cheeks. 
 Bottom of yer feet. 
 Get dressed. 
 269. See ABBOTT, supra note 265, at 25: 
I suffered from claustrophobia for years when I first went to prison. I never knew any 
form of suffering more horrible in my life.  
 The air in your cell vanishes. You are smothering. Your eyes bulge out; you clutch 
at your throat; you scream like a banshee. Your arms flail the air in your cell. You reel 
about the cell, falling. 
 Then you suffer cramps. The walls press you from all directions with an invisible 
force. You struggle to push it back. The oxygen makes you giddy with anxiety. You 
become hollow and empty. There is a vacuum in the pit of your stomach. You retch.  
 270. See CARTER, supra note 265, at 163, 165 (“In jail, boredom was in inescapable fact of 
daily life. . . . [L]ife . . . became a dreary ritual. Time inside dragged, though the months flew 
past my window at an alarming rate.”); WIDEMAN, supra note 261, at 230: 
[O]utside your cell ain’t nothing going on but the same old [expletive deleted]. That’s 
what gets to you after a while. Repetition. Same ole, same ole all the time. Same 
[expletive deleted] on the hangout corner. Same slop at breakfast. Same nasty guards. 
One day just like the other. Same simple cats doing the same dumb numbers. Day in 
and day out. It gets to you. It surely does. 
 271. See ABBOTT, supra note 265, at 13: 
Can you imagine how I feel—to be treated as a little boy and not as a man? And when 
I was a little boy, I was treated as a man—and can you imagine what that does to a 
boy? . . . . 
 So. A guard frowns at me and says: “Why are you not at work?” Or: “Tuck in your 
shirttail!” Do this and do that. The way a little boy is spoken to. This is something I 
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dying there,272 these prisoners write of a living death. 
Robby Wideman, the brother of novelist John Edgar Wideman, is 
serving a life sentence for murder in a Pennsylvania prison. He grew 
up in the Homewood section pf Pittsburgh, an impoverished urban 
community in which incarceration was, and remains, commonplace. 
This fact does not alter his painful prison life. He writes of the way in 
which law can eradicate an existence:  
I heard from the courts they denied my appeal, they denied my 
existence as being in any way meaningful or of having any 
worth at all. I received this devastating news last Friday . . . 
and have been in a state of depression ever since. I’m trying 
hard to keep it all together but right now it’s really hard to find 
a reason to keep it together, for they seem to have taken away 
all reasons worth trying.273 
John Edgar Wideman observes his brother’s difficulty in 
maintaining his identity behind bars—as a son, a brother, a friend, 
and a man—and coping with a lengthy incarceration. The trick is to 
stay connected to life on the outside but not overly attached to it: 
Robby cares about family business and likes to keep up with 
who’s doing what . . . but he also treats the news objectively, 
cold-bloodedly. Family affairs have everything and nothing to 
do with him. He’s in exile, powerless to influence what goes 
on outside the walls, so he maintains a studied detachment; he 
hears what I say and quickly mulls it over, buries the 
worrisome parts, grins at good news. When he comments on 
bad news it’s usually a grunt, a nod, or a gesture with his hands 
that says all there is to say and says, A million words wouldn’t 
 
have had to deal with not for a year or two—nor even ten years—but for, so far, 
eighteen years.  
 272. See Wilbert Rideau, Dying in Prison, in RIDEAU & WIKBERG, supra note 265, at 158-
78. In one passage, Rideau describes the dead inmate’s coffin: “It was a cheap beige coffin, 
made of some synthetic material that looked almost like wood. Someone had written HEAD 
across one end of it with a Mark-a-lot so people would know the difference.” Id. at 159. 
 273. WIDEMAN, supra note 261, at 170 (quoting a letter from Robby Wideman). For a 
broader comment on law’s violence, see NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS 
OF ROBERT COVER 203-39 (Martha Minow, et. al, eds. 1993); Austin Sarat, Robert Cover on 
Law and Violence, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW, supra at 255-65. 
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make any difference, would they. Learning to isolate himself, 
to build walls within the walls enclosing him is a mater of 
survival. If he doesn’t insulate himself against those things he 
can’t change, if he can’t discipline himself to ignore and 
forget, to narrow the range of his concerns to what he can 
immediately practically effect, he’ll go crazy.274  
Rubin “Hurricane” Carter made his wife divorce him because he 
could not strike that balance. He could not cope with emotional 
attachment, with need. These things did not fit with prison.275 No 
matter how shameful the civil allegation or how steep the penalty, 
one simply cannot say that there is no meaningful difference between 
the stakes in civil and criminal court. The price of criminal 
punishment is unparalleled. 
V. DOES THE DIFFERENCE IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE WARRANT A 
DIFFERENT ETHICAL STANDARD? 
Generally speaking, those questioning the difference in criminal 
defense assume that if criminal defense is different, there ought to be 
a different ethical standard.276 This is by no means an inevitable step. 
Some argue that law practice is varied and contextual and there ought 
to be different ethical standards throughout law practice.277 The fact 
that different types of law practice may be different, however, does 
not necessarily mean that ethical standards should be tailored to fit 
each type of practice.  
There is an important question of context and degree. While I 
disagree with those who argue that criminal defense cannot be 
meaningfully distinguished from civil law practice as a whole, I agree 
that some noncriminal law practice comes awfully close: involuntary 
mental health commitment proceedings, some immigration 
proceedings, and termination of parental rights.278 Each of these 
 
 274. WIDEMAN, supra note 261, at 193. 
 275. See SAM CHAITON & TERRY SWINTON, LAZARUS AND THE HURRICANE 67 (1991); 
CARTER, supra note 265, at 307; THE HURRICANE (Universal Pictures 1999). 
 276. See Zacharias, Civil-Criminal Distinction, supra note 31, at 165-67. 
 277. See Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, supra note 31, at 190-203. 
 278. See Mann, supra note 124, at 1795 (suggesting that clients who are subjected to 
government-initiated punitive investigation or litigation are in the same posture as criminal 
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proceedings involves the state and threatens a terrible loss. 
Importantly, each of these proceedings usually involves an indigent 
party with court-appointed counsel. 
From both an outside-in and an inside-out perspective, adversarial 
zeal is most important when the stakes are high, the adversary 
powerful, and the level of trust between the lawyer and client low.279 
The only way to compensate for the disadvantage in resources and 
power is to allow a more fiercely adversarial ethic on behalf of 
intimidated and isolated clients who lack the means to hire their own 
attorneys. Only through zealous advocacy can there be meaningful 
access to justice.280 
Still, I am not convinced that even this set of circumstances, a 
frightened client facing an adversary with more resources relying on 
an untrusted lawyer, is so unique to criminal and quasi-criminal 
proceedings to justify a different ethical standard. As a criminal 
defender who has had limited experience in other areas of legal 
practice,281 I am wary of the self-reference, if not self-importance, of 
suggesting that no other lawyer has felt what I have. What about 
hard-fought divorce cases involving a well-connected lawyer 
husband and his homemaker wife?282 What about unwitting or 
unsophisticated victims of industrial pollution who take on 
multinational corporations and their high-powered lawyers?283 What 
about poor black rural southerners who take on the political 
establishment to obtain their own share of power?284 What about 
 
defendants). It should be noted that a criminal prosecution can lead to these other proceedings, 
and often does.  
 279. It is worth noting, however, that Lord Brougham’s classic statement of zeal occurred 
in the context of a divorce: the divorce of Queen Caroline from George IV before the House of 
Lords. See supra note 27. But see Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, supra note 31, at 
170 n.10 (asserting that “modern professional responsibility theory does not fully accept 
Brougham’s extreme conception of lawyer partisanship, but does contemplate supreme loyalty 
by criminal defense lawyers”). 
 280. See Ellmann, supra note 77, at 131-41 (defending the commitment of zealous 
advocacy against David Luban’s moral critique). 
 281. See generally Abbe Smith, On Representing a Victim of Crime, in LAW STORIES 
(Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996). 
 282. See generally BELLA STUMBO, UNTIL THE TWELFTH OF NEVER: THE DEADLY 
DIVORCE OF DAN AND BETTY BRODERICK (1993). 
 283. See generally JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995). 
 284. See generally MELISSA FAY GREENE, PRAYING FOR SHEETROCK: A WORK OF 
NONFICTION (1991). 
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battered women seeking protection for themselves and their 
children?285 What about poor people in general, with problems 
relating to government benefits, decent housing, medical care, and 
their family situation?286 
Although thoughtful scholars have proposed ethical schemes with 
two or more tiers,287 I believe this is a bad idea and ultimately a 
dangerous one. Not only is it impossible to draw a principled line 
between criminal and civil practice,288 but it is impossible to draw 
tenable categorical lines at all. There are also a host of practical 
difficulties in developing an ethical scheme that reflects all of the 
contexts of legal practice.289  
The danger is to the adversary system itself, and the constitutional 
principles underlying it. The push to curb zealous representation in 
civil cases will inevitably jeopardize zealous representation in 
criminal cases and the rights of the accused.290 As we have seen, the 
critique of “adversarial excess” invariably spills over into the 
criminal system. Formalizing distinctions in practice through 
different ethical standards will lead to diminished advocacy on behalf 
of everyone, especially those who need it most. 
The accused and their defenders are politically vulnerable. As the 
criminally accused and convicted have limited support and clout in 
the general community, the criminal defenders have similarly limited 
support and clout in their own professional community.291 The power 
lies with civil practitioners, members of large firms who represent 
 
 285. See generally Abbe Smith & Ilene Seidman, Lawyers for the Abused and Lawyers for 
the Accused: An Interfaith Marriage, 47 LOY. L. REV. 415 (2001). 
 286. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 1960-73 (1993); Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 1401 (1995) (reviewing DAVIS, supra); Louise G. Trubek, The Worst of Times . . . and 
the Best of Times: Lawyering for Poor Clients Today, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1123 (1995). 
 287. See Freedman, A Proposal for Different Ethical Standards for Criminal and Civil 
Representation, supra note 134; LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 58-66; 
Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, supra note 27, at 605-07; Zacharias, 
Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, supra note 31. 
 288. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 65 (“[T]he simple 
criminal/civil (or criminal + quasi-criminal/civil) distinction is too simple to capture the real 
[ethical] issues at stake between the criminal defense and civil suit paradigms.”). 
 289. See Freedman, A Proposal for Different Ethical Standards, supra note 134. 
 290. See id. 
 291. See MCINTYRE, supra note 171, at 62-66. 
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wealthy corporations and individuals in civil matters,292 and their 
clients. With a unitary ethical standard, civil practitioners have an 
incentive to maintain the ethic of zeal in criminal defense as well as 
civil litigation. As Monroe Freedman notes: “[C]ivil practitioners 
typically justify their own zealous representation by invoking the 
criminal defense paradigm. If we were to mitigate zealous 
representation in civil representation, therefore, criminal 
representation could ultimately suffer the same fate.”293  
It has become “old-fashioned” to defend, or worse, exalt, the 
adversary system. It is hopelessly prehistoric in a postmodern 
world.294 But could it really be possible that values such as liberty, 
dignity, and autonomy have lost their relevance? Could it be that the 
defense lawyer’s role in maintaining a free society is passé? I do not 
think so. Even an ardent proponent of alternative dispute resolution 
like Professor Carrie Menkel Meadow concedes that if she were in 
trouble she would want a zealous advocate.295 
The criminal defense paradigm must continue to serve as a 
standard, not an anomaly. The criminal defense lawyer must continue 
to be “the archetype of the advocate in the adversary system.”296 
Without a high standard of adversarial zeal, the standard of the 
impassioned lawyer fighting for a client “though the heavens [may] 
fall,”297 will diminish throughout the legal profession.  
To the extent there are excesses in advocacy, civil or criminal, 
eliminating zeal altogether is not the answer. There are built-in 
checks. There is an adversary; there is a judge; and there are 
disciplinary boards.298  
 
 292. See FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 9, ch. 10; Corporate 
Lawyers and Their Clients: Some Special Ethical Rules; Freedman, A Proposal for Different 
Ethical Standards, supra note 134. 
 293. See Freedman, A Proposal for Different Ethical Standards for Criminal and Civil 
Representation, supra note 134. 
 294. See Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble With the Adversary System in a Postmodern 
Multicultural World, supra note 42. 
 295. See id. Telephone Interview with Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professor of Law, 
Georgetown University Law Center (Nov. 6, 2002). 
 296. Schwartz, supra note 131, at 548. 
 297. FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 66. 
 298. But see Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers 
Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to 
Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547, 549 nn.12, 
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There is inevitably some individual judgment about what methods 
to employ on behalf of a client, but this judgment should be strategic. 
The aim should be to best serve the client’s interests and not the 
product of individual lawyer misgivings, regardless of whether we 
call these misgivings “justice.” The lawyer is, of course, free to share 
his or her misgivings with the client. But the client need not heed 
them.299 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The air was dead and flat, and nothing stirred but Roger’s 
slow, half-creeping march into the room. He had paused on the 
threshold with a little gasp when he first saw the chair, and the 
guards had gently urged him forward. He reached it now and 
paused to turn around. 
 “Have you any last request?” the Warden asked? 
 Roger’s eyes darted about. He couldn’t see into the 
darkened room from within the circle of light. “Mr. Longa?” 
he asked timidly. 
 “I’m here, Roger.” Morris’s voice came distinctly from the 
shadow, and the Warden looked up angrily. The rule was 
silence, and Morris had not dared to speak before, in fear of 
being excluded or even ejected from the room. But now he 
spoke in answer to the boy’s question. A light jumped into 
Roger’s eyes and a faint smile crossed his face. 
 “Mr. Longa,” he managed to whisper, looking in the 
direction of the voice. “Thanks for everything.” 
—Curtis Bok300 
 
13 (1998) (noting that the number of complaints filed against lawyers has increased steadily, 
but the rate of formal disciplinary charges has remained constant). 
 299. See FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 74-49. 
 300. CURTIS BOK, STAR WORMWOOD 182 (1959). 
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I lived through Manny’s case. I even managed to ameliorate the 
sentence.301 But the case remains with me, the burden not quite lifted 
so long as Manny is in prison. I hear from him from time to time; he 
is serving his sentence in a prison somewhere in the Midwest, far 
away from friends and family. He laments the lack of programs and 
the lack of training. He wants desperately to make something of his 
time there. He is grateful for what we did for him; sometimes I think 
he is too thankful. He remained gracious at the worst moments, never 
blaming us for anything that happened. 
The difference in criminal defense is in Manny’s continuing 
plight, and in my connection to his plight. In his 1951 paean to 
zealous advocacy, The Ethics of Advocacy,302 Charles Curtis calls the 
lawyer-client relationship “intimate,” like kinship and friendship.303 
Curtis notes that zealous advocacy puts the client above all others, 
even above the lawyer: “You devote yourself to the interests of 
another at the peril of yourself . . . . Men will do for others what they 
are not willing to do for themselves—nobler as well as ignoble 
things.”304 
This is lawyering at its best. If the archetype of the zealous 
criminal defender—the devoted advocate fighting for fairness, 
dignity, and justice for her client—sets the standard for all lawyers, 
this is a good thing both for the profession and those that the 
profession will serve. 
 
 301. Remarkably, and to the credit of a “conscientious” senior prosecutor (see FREEDMAN, 
supra note 9, at 236) the United States Attorney’s Office joined our efforts to modify the 
sentence. Together, we convinced a judge not ordinarily inclined to change his mind to suspend 
all but six years of the sentence imposed.  
 302. See Curtis, supra note 27. 
 303. Id. at 8. 
 304. Id. at 6. 
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